“Soldiering on in Hope”: United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars by Roberts, Anna
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2003 
“Soldiering on in Hope”: United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil 
Wars 
Anna Roberts 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anna Roberts, “Soldiering on in Hope”: United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 839 (2003). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/596 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
"SOLDIERING ON IN HOPE": UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS
ANNA ROBERTS*
1. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General, faced
with the choice of withdrawing the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) that had been unable to complete its mandate
in Croatia, or leaving it in a situation for which its size was
inadequate, remarked that "the choice in Croatia is between
continuing a mission that is clearly unable to fulfil [sic] its
original mandate in full or withdrawing and risking a renewed
war that would probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to
return to restore peace. Given such a choice, soldiering on in
hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication."' The re-
mark exemplifies the choice facing the Security Council in a
number of post-Cold War civil war situations. Doing nothing
would have been seen as an "abdication" of responsibility, es-
pecially where the United Nations was the only organization
available to act, and yet, for certain robust operations, the
number of troops offered by Member States would clearly be
unequal to the required tasks. Nevertheless, in the face of
warning signs regarding the unlikelihood of Member States
contributing troops or of the parties in conflict cooperating,
the Security Council authorized U.N. operations, faute de
mieux, in the hope that something would be better than noth-
ing. In the light of a series of operations in which something
was arguably not better than nothing, it is necessary to ex-
amine other ways in which the Security Council might meet its
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
This Note will examine the consequences of the Security
Council's decisions to deploy under-resourced operations to
* With many thanks to Thomas Franck, Shelley Fenchel, the
2001-2002 Junior Fellows of the Center for International Studies at NYU
School of Law, the Participants at the 2002 Center for International Studies
Conference, Alexandra Perina, Kathryn Sabbeth, and my beloved mother.
1. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 1 45, U.N. Doc. S/1994/300 (1994).
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civil war situations and various proposed means by which the
Security Council might more effectively fulfill its responsibili-
ties. Part II will look at a number of post-Cold War U.N. oper-
ations in civil wars-UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia,
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda II (UNAMIR II), and
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)-and
show how, at least partly because of the Security Council's fail-
ure to ensure that the operations it authorized were provided
with sufficient numbers of adequately equipped troops,2 signif-
icant mandate elements could not be achieved. Part III will
argue that decisions to authorize an inadequate number of
troops and supplies (in Croatia, Somalia, Bosnia, and Sierra
Leone), or to authorize troops whose rapid deployment was
unlikely (in Rwanda and Bosnia), were taken in the face of
clear indications of the likely obstacles to success, thus sug-
gesting that the cause of failure was not lack of information,
unexpected events on the ground, or unexpected failures to
commit troops. What is required is not an improvement in,
for example, the U.N.'s intelligence capability, but, rather,
structural change to the peacekeeping system. Part IV will ex-
amine various proposed changes to the system of U.N.
peacekeeping that aim to avoid this phenomenon of under-
resourcing, and will argue that none of them offers a politi-
cally achievable way of remedying these flaws. Part V will ar-
gue that, since a blanket decision by the Security Council to
avoid involvement in any situation where these "warning signs"
exist would represent an abdication of its responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, efforts at in-
novation should be focused not on overhauling the system of
U.N. peacekeeping, but on improving means of U.N. involve-
ment with other force providers-regional and multina-
tional-whereby the strengths of each can be used to improve,
and guard against the failings of, the other.
2. Naturally, the number of troops is only one of the salient factors that
might be addressed. Level of authorized force is another obvious example,
since none of these operations had an unqualified Chapter VII authoriza-
tion to use "all necessary means." See infra Parts II.A.2, I.B.2, 1I.C.2, II.D.2,
and 1I.E.2.
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In 1991, Croatia, one of the six republics of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, declared itself independent.
The federal government, through the Yugoslav National Army
(JNA), intervened in opposition." On January 2, 1992, repre-
sentatives of Croatia and the JNA signed an Implementing Ac-
cord on a cease-fire. 4 At the end ofJanuary, the U.N. adopted
the "Vance Plan," which called for the creation of "U.N. Pro-
tected Areas" (UNPAs), overlapping with the areas which had
contained a substantial proportion of Serbs before the war.
5
Once the agreement of Serbia, Croatia and the Croatian Serbs
had, at least nominally, been obtained, the Security Council
passed Resolution 743, establishing a United Nations Protec-
tion Force (UNPROFOR) for the UNPAs. 6
2. Mandate & Means
Among the tasks of UNPROFOR as envisaged in the Sec-
retary-General's Report of December 11, 1991, was to ensure
that the UNPAs "remained demilitarized and that all persons
residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack."7
14,000 peacekeepers were authorized for the UNPAs,8 but de-
3. See T. Modibo Ocran, How Blessed Were the UN Peacekeepers in Former
Yugoslavia? The Involvement of UNPROFOR and Other UN Bodies in Humanita-
rian Activities and Human Rights Issues in Croatia, 1992-1996, 18 WIs. INT'L LJ.
193, 193 (2000).
4. See S.C. Res. 727, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1992).
5. MARCUS TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR 279 (1997).
The UNPAs were to cover one-quarter of Croatian territory. Id.
6. See S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/743 (1992).
7. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721
(1991), U.N. SCOR, 12, U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991). Resolution 743 ap-
proved this mandate element. S.C. Res. 743, supra note 6, 1.
8. Cf id. 2.
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ployment was slow.' It was not fully achieved until February
1993, one year after authorization.' 0
3. Failure to Implement
UNPROFOR failed to ensure that the UNPAs were demili-
tarized or that all UNPA residents were protected from armed
attacks. With respect to demilitarization, UNPROFOR did suc-
ceed in ensuring the complete withdrawal of the JNA from the
territory of Croatia. l ' However, paramilitary forces were cre-
ated in the UNPAs in violation of the U.N. peacekeeping plan,
and the number of armed Serbs in the UNPAs, rather than
decreasing, significantly increased.'2 As for fear of armed attack,
"the peacekeepers were largely ignored in Croatia as the vio-
lence"-and de facto Serb controll3 -"continued around
them."1 4 Attacks from outside the UNPAs included incursions
by the Croatian government in January and September of
1993. As for attacks from within, the period of UNPROFOR's
deployment saw coercion of residents of all of the UNPAs1 5
and on both sides of the conflict.1 6
9. Wolfgang Biermann & Martin Vadset, From UNPFto IFO Windows of
Opportunity 1991 to 1996, in UN PEACEKEEPING IN TROUBLE: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 63, 69 (Wolfgang Biermann & Martin Vadset
eds., 1998).
10. See id.
11. Report of the Secrary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), supra
note 1, 7 8.
12. See Elgin Clemons, Note, No Peace to Keep: Six and Three-Quarters
Peacekeepers, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 107, 126-27 (1993) ("However, the
number of armed Serbs in the UNPA's grew to the size of an army."); Joanna
Spear, Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Inlernal Conflict, in
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 377, 408 (Michael E.
Brown ed., 1996) (explaining that "[w]hen the JNA withdrew and the TDFs
[Territorial Defense Forces] were demobilized, strengthened police and mil-
itary organizations emerged in their place").
13. See RKHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 32-33 (1998).
14. Clemons, supra note 12, at 127.
15. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
762 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 7 14-18, U.N. Doc. S/24353 (1992).
16. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
743 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 7, U.N. Doc. S/23777 (1992). UNPROFOR faced
a situation where the remaining Croats in the UNPAs had "in many cases
been relentlessly persecuted, suffering murder, assault, threats, armed thefts
and arson." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
815 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 7 9, U.N. Doc. S/25777 (1993). Across the confron-
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4. Assessment
The chances that UNPROFOR would succeed were less-
ened by the initial failure to achieve rapid deployment. 7 With
ethnic cleansing continuing almost unopposed,' 8 most non-
Serbs had been expelled from the UNPAs by the time that UN-
PROFOR was operational.' 9 Yet it was unrealistic to hope that
even the full authorized force of 14,000 lightly armed
peacekeepers could ensure the freedom from fear of all inhab-
itants of the protected areas: The force was far too small to
complete its mandate without meaningful cooperation from
the parties in conflict.211
B. UNOSOM 121
1. Introduction
In January 1991, President Siad Barre fled Somalia when
his army was routed by an alliance of opposition forces. 22 How-
ever, the alliance soon splintered into competing groups. The
United Somali Congress, which controlled Mogadishu, split
into two factions under the leadership of Ali Mahdi and
Mohamed Farah Aidid, respectively. 23 Mahdi had been
named interim President, 24 but the country lacked a central
tation line, Serbs suffered similar atrocities. See Report of the Secretmy-General
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), supra 16.
17. See David. J. Scheffer, United Nations Peace Operations and Prospectsfor a
Standlby Force, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 649, 652 (1995) ("Delayed deployment
of UNPROFOR infantry components posed a significant risk to the cease-fire
in Croatia in early 1992.").
18. OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODiiousE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACEKEEPIN. OPERATIONS 279 (1999).
19. Id.
20. JOHN HILLEN, BLUE HELMETS: THE SFRATEGY OF UN MILITARY OPERA-
TIONS 175 (2d ed. 2000).
21. This analysis will focus on the security personnel authorized by the
Security Council as part of United Nations Operation in Somalia I
(UNOSOM I), prior to the deployment of the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF).
22. Clement E. Adibe, Learning from Failure of Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution in Somalia, in A FUTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING? 118, 120 (Edward
Moxon-Browne ed., 1998).
23. Id.
24. MICHAEL WESLEY, CASUALTIES OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER 68 (1997).
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government. 25 "From November 1991, there was heavy fight-
ing in Mogadishu" between these two, and other, factions. 26
On March 3, 1992, the two main parties signed cease-fire
agreements, including provisions for the implementation of
measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through the de-
ployment of U.N. monitors.2 7 Aidid and Mahdi signed agree-
ments on March 27th and 28th respectively,2 8 specifying that
the United Nations would deploy 50 observers to monitor the
cease-fire, as well as "adequate" security personnel for humani-
tarian relief operations.29
2. Mandate & Means
UNOSOM I was created by Resolution 751 of April 24,
1992, in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-
General to deploy 50 military observers immediately" and, "in
principle," a security force of 500 "as soon as possible.""' The
security force was to be lightly armed; to provide security for
relief personnel, equipment and supplies at Mogadishu's port
and airport; and to escort convoys of relief supplies.3 2
3. Failure to Implement
Not until August 12, 1992 did Aidid and Mahdi agree to
the deployment of the 500-strong security force envisaged in
the Resolution of April 24,3 and the troops did not arrive un-
til October. 34 Once in Mogadishu, they were met by forces of
vastly superior size and weaponry35 who prevented them from
25. See THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING
at 287, U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.14 (1996).
26. Id.
27. See generally S.C. Res. 746, U.N. SCOR, 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/746 (1992).
28. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA: 1992-1996, 19 (1996).
29. Id.
30. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 3069th mntg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751
(1992).
31. Id. at 4..
32. See The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretaty-General, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 27, U.N. Doc. S/23829 (1992).
33. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 28, at 26.
34. JANE BOULDEN, PEACE ENFORCEMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS EXPERI-
ENCE IN CONGO, SOMALIA, AND BOSNIA 56 (2001).
35. See id.
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leaving the airport, let alone carrying out their mandate. 36 On
December 3, 1992, the Security Council approved the U.S. of-
fer to, in the words of Resolution 794, "establish[ ] a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations, ' '37 since
UNOSOM's existing course would be an inadequate response
to the situation.3 8 The requirement of consent was aban-
doned; the multinational force, UNITAF, was given Chapter
VII authorization to use all necessary means to fulfill its man-
date.
4. Assessment
The Force Commander, Imtiaz Shaheen, has stated that
while he was "very satisfied with the rules of engagement, '3 '
the force "was simply too small to be effective. ' 141 Even before
the deployment of the 500 troops began, it was clear to the
Secretary-General that there were far too few peacekeepers4'
given the "lawlessness and violence in Mogadishu." 42 37,000
troops were subsequently used in the U.S.-led UNITAF. As
Katherine Cox argues, it had become apparent that UNOSOM
I was "essentially a traditional peacekeeping operation that
failed primarily because the situation into which it went was
not conducive to peacekeeping. '14 3
36. ,VII LIANI SHAWCROSS, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: PEACEKEEPERS, WAR -
LORDS AND A WORILD OF ENDLESS CONFLICT 87 (2000).
37. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., at 7. U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992).
38. Id.
39. Keith B. Richburg, Top U.N. Officer in Somalia Says Tactics Were Apt,
WASI. Post, Jan. 23, 1993, at A12.
40. Id.
41. See Boutros-Ghali, supra note 28, at 26. Jeffrey Clark describes the
number as "minuscule." Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collec-
live Response, in ENFORCINc RESTRANT 205, 221 (Lori Fisler Darnrosch ed.,
1993).
42. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 28, at 26.
43. Katherine E. Cox, Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Oper-
ations and the Use of Force, 27 DEN\'. J. INT'L L. & POL\' 239, 259 (1999).
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C. UNPROFOR (Bosnia)
1. Introduction
On March 3, 1992, the Bosnian government declared the
country's independence. 44 Within a month, conflict broke out
between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs45 who hoped to
create a "greater Serbia" from the former Yugoslavia's constitu-
ent republics. 4 6 By the end of 1992, the Serbs controlled 70
percent of Bosnian territory. After fighting intensified in east-
ern Bosnia in March 1993, with Bosnian Serb paramilitaries
attacking several cities, including Srebrenica, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 819, which demanded that all
parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area"
free from any hostile act.47 In Resolution 824 of May 6, five
more towns-Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo-
were declared "safe areas,"'48 and a month later the Security
Council mandated a role for UNPROFOR within them 49 in or-
der "to ensure full respect for the safe areas. ' 50
2. Mandate & Means
Resolution 836 of June 4, 1993, extended UNPROFOR's
mandate in order to enable it "to deter attacks against the safe
areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of
military or paramilitary units other than those of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to oc-
cupy some key points on the ground. '5 1 It authorized UN-
PROFOR, "in carrying out [this] mandate . . . , acting in self-
44. See Ved P. Nanda et al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda
and Liberia-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under Interna-
tional Law-Part II, 26 DENv. J. INT'L L. & PoL'x 827, 839 (1998).
45. Id. at 839-40.
46. WESLEY, supra note 24, at 31.
47. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819
(1993).
48. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993). This resolution was described by Madeleine Albright, who voted for
it, as "a palliative." U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3208
(1993).
49. Id. UNPROFOR had been established on February 21, 1992, with its
initial deployment limited to Croatia. See S. C. Res. 743, supra note 6, 2.
50. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1994).
51. Id.
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defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of
force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any
of the parties or to armed incursion into them."52
Resolution 844 of June 18, 1993, authorized the deploy-
ment of 7,600 troops to the "safe areas,' 53 yet it took a year for
them to arrive and be deployed. 54 Fewer than 3,000 had ar-
rived byJanuary 7, 1994,55 and only 5,200 by March 11, 1994.56
In 1995, when the "safe areas" came under sustained attack by
Bosnian Serb forces, full deployment had not been achieved. 5 7
3. Failure to Implement
Up to 20,000 people were killed in and around the "safe
areas. ' 5" In none of the areas did UNPROFOR successfully
implement its mandate to deter attacks. The most shocking
demonstration of the United Nations' inadequacy came at
Srebrenica, where, in July 1995, the Serbs, having captured the
"safe area," murdered some 7,414 men and boys. 59 Serb bom-
bardments caused numerous civilian casualties in Tuzla and
Gorazde."3 1 In November 1994, air attacks were mounted by
52. d. It also decided that "Member States, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, may take .. all necessary measures,
through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to support the Force in the performance of its mandate
id.
53. See S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1994).
54. Report of the Secrelaty-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959
(1994), U.N. SCOR, 54, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1389 (1994). "UNPROFOR
troop deployments in Bosnia never reached authorized levels." lvo H. Daal-
der, Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF INTERNAL CONFIic-r 35, 55 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996).
55. See The Situation in Bosnia and Hezegovina: Report of the Secretaty-Gen-
eral Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 29 of General Assembly Resolution 48/88,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 42, 9, U.N. Doc. A/48/847 (1994).
56. Report of the Secretar,-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 900
(1994), U.N. SCOR, 9, U.N. Doc. S/1994/291 (1994).
57. See Mats R. Berdal, The Security Council, Peacekeeping, and Internal Con-
flict After the Cold War, 7 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 71, 83 (1996).
58. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/
35: The Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 42, 3, U.N.
Doc. A/54/549 (1999) [hereinafter Srebrenica Report]. They were "over-
whelmingly from the Bosnian Muslim community." Id
59. SHAWCROSS, supra note 36, at 176.
60. On May 25, 1995, the crowded downtown area of Tuzla was subjected
to a massive bombardment, leaving an estimated 70 people dead and almost
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the "Krajina Serbs" into the Bihac pocket in support of Bos-
nian Serb forces advancing toward the "safe area."6 1 In Sara-
jevo, the launching of Serb shells into the "safe areas," often
with civilian rather than military targets, began in April 1992,
and continued, off and on, until August 1995.
4. Assessment
According to Karsten Prager, the "spate of resolutions"6 2
designating the "safe areas" was "[o]ne of the most poignant
examples of Security Council overreach. ' 63 Fulfilling the man-
date of deterring attacks in "safe areas" would have required a
larger number of troops than was ever supplied. 64 The Serb
advance in November 1994 towards the town of Bihac, in an
enclave inhabited by 170,000 people, 6 5 was not halted by the
presence of a company-strength unit.66 Nor were the Serb
forces deterred from their offensive on Gorazde, an enclave
with an estimated population of 65,000,67 by the presence of
130 injured. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 12, U.N. Doc. S/
1995/444 (1995). A Serb bombardment of Gorazde at the end of March,
1994, claimed the lives of 30 people and wounded 132. US Accuses Serbs of
Atrocities, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 2/Apr. 3, 1994, at 2.
61. See Report of the Secretay-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
959 (1994), supra note 54, 16.
62. Karsten Prager, The Limits of Peacekeeping, TIME, Oct. 23, 1995, availa-
ble at http://www.time.com/international/1995/951023/cover2.html.
63. Id.
64. Interview with a staff member at the Executive Office of the Secre-
tary-General, in New York, NY (Dec. 3, 2001). According to Jane Boulden,
media coverage "contributed to a general public misunderstanding of the
mission and pressure for increased use of force rather than highlighting the
need for greater resources." BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 113 ("Even when the
mandate and the ROE [Rules of Engagement] gave UN troops the ability to
use force, they could not be expected to use force to attempt to fulfill the
mission mandate when they were out-numbered and out-gunned by the par-
ties to the conflict.").
65. See Bosnia-Hercegovina: Serb Counterattack on Bihac, KEESING'S REC. OF
WORLD EVENTS (Nov. 1994) ("[I]n the Bihac enclave was a force of 1,300
lightly armed Bangladeshi UNPROFOR ... soldiers.").
66. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
959 (1994), supra note 54, 27.
67. See Bosnia-Hercegovina: UN Debacle in Gorazde, KEESING'S REC. OF
WORLD EVENTS (Apr. 1994).
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eight military observers from the United Nations.68 At the
time of the fall of Srebrenica, with its 40,000 Muslim inhabi-
tants, some 600 U.N. personnel were deployed in the "safe
area," but only 300 were infantry soldiers; the remainder
served in various support capacities. 69 The U.N. presence in
Zepa, with its 16,000 residents, 70 comprised, at the time of its
fall, a single battalion of Ukrainian troops71 who, in the assess-
ment of the Srebrenica Report, were "clearly incapable of re-
sisting a concerted Serb attack."72
The force level had indeed been envisaged, in the Secre-
tary-General's Report of June 14, 1993, as insufficient "to resist
a concentrated assault. '73 Advice from the Force Commander
had indicated that 34,000 troops would be needed in order to
provide effective deterrence, but the Security Council voted
for the "light option" of 7,600. Since this option could not
completely guarantee defense of the "safe areas," 74 it relied on
the threat of NATO airpower. 75 NATO, however, was not only
an insufficient deterrent,76 but also a problematic partner. 77
68. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
900 (1994), supra note 56, 16.
69. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 226.
70. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE
OF GENOCIDE 417 (2002).
71. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 395.
72. Id. See also id. 318 (quoting a report by the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General, immediately following the fall of Srebrenica, which
stated that if Zepa were to be attacked the Ukrainian forces would "not be
able to mount much of a defence.").
73. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836
(1993), U.N. SCOR, 4, U.N. Doc. S/25939 (1993).
74. Id. 1 5.
75. Id. See also id. f 4 ("Since it is assumed that UNPROFOR ground
troops will not be sufficient to resist a concentrated assault on any of the safe
areas, particular emphasis must be placed on the availability of a credible air-
strike capability provided by Member States.").
76. See Michael Stopford, Peace-Keeping or Peace-Enforcement: Stark Choices
for Grey Areas, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 499, 510 (1996). The Secretary-Gen-
eral admitted that "the threat of air power is, at best, of very limited utility in
compelling the Bosnian Serbs to respect the safe areas." Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994), supra note 54, 141.
See also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 13, U.N. Doc. S/1994/555 (1994) (UNPROFOR "never had suffi-
cient resources, even with air support, to defend the safe areas against a
deliberate attack or to hold ground.").
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Obvious drawbacks included the kidnappings, 78 bombard-
ments, 79 and obstruction of UNPROFOR's primary humanita-
rian mission,80 as well as perceptions of U.N. partiality,8 that
followed NATO action. Another was that U.N. troops took on,
in addition to their mandated duties, the task of patrolling the
exclusion zones declared by NATO, even though the high
levels of manpower required put a further strain on the re-
sources allocated to the "safe areas." 82 In Bihac,83 Srebren-
77. See Report of the Secretay-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions
982 (1995) and 987 (1995), supra note 60, 6.
78. "Being widely dispersed," UNPROFOR personnel were "extremely
vulnerable to obstruction, detention and other forms of harassment." Ian
Johnstone, Remarks at International Law Odyssey 2001: Beyond the Limits,
International Law Weekend 2001 of the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association (Oct. 27, 2001) [hereinafter International Law Week-
end]. Because of this, according to Johnstone, "the threat of strikes was not
real." Id.
79. On May 25, 1995, after NATO strikes on an ammunition dump near
the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale, the Bosnian Serbs retaliated against
every safe area except Zepa. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Secur-
ity Council Resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), supra note 60, 12. The
crowded downtown area of Tuzla was subjected to a massive bombardment,
in which some 70 civilians were killed and over 130 injured. See id.
80. See Report of the Secretary- General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
959 (1994), supra note 54, 41. A staff member at the Executive Office of the
Secretary-General describes the Secretariat as having faced a "moral di-
lemma" over what was "more important-humanitarian assistance to mil-
lions of people in central Bosnia, or some 20,000 people in Srebrenica."
Interview, supra note 64. The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina has stated, "In determining the goals to be pursued and the level of
force, I could not, as a commander, ignore the primary humanitarian as-
pects of the mission, or ever forget that 2.7 million people were still depen-
dent on United Nations aid for their survival. Every time I called for NATO
air strikes the movement across Serb-held territory was halted and people
died." Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 162 (internal quotations omitted).
81. One reason the Secretary-General has given for the reluctance to use
air power against the Serbs is the belief that "we would be perceived as hav-
ing entered the war against them, something not authorized by the Security
Council and potentially fatal for a peacekeeping operation." Srebrenica Re-
port, supra note 58, 482. With respect to the Mission's attempts at peace-
making, after even' hostage-taking "negotiations were brought to an abrupt
halt, except for the lengthy negotiations required to secure release of the
hostages." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions
982 (1995) and 987 (1995), supra note 60, 69.
82. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994), U.N.
SCOR, 41, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1067 (1994). U.N. military commanders "ar-
gued that UNPROFOR troops already operating at well below desirable
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ica,8 4 and Gorazde, 85 the threat of air action failed to keep the
Serbs away from the "safe areas," and in Srebrenica 8 6 and
Gorazde8 7 the use of air action was avoided because of fears
for the safety of U.N. hostages. Even before the fall of Zepa
and Srebrenica, the Secretary-General had concluded that
NATO's support was insufficient to make the "safe areas" con-
cept viable: He stated on December 1, 1994, that "[t]he exper-
iences at Gorazde and Bihac provide stark evidence that in the
absence of consent and cooperation, the 'light option,'
adopted as an initial measure and supported by air power
alone, cannot be expected to be effective in protecting the
safe areas. '8 8 The consent and cooperation on which the
"light option" relied 9 were never forthcoming.
D. UNAMIR J[()
1. Introduction
Fighting broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) and the government of President Habyarimana after an
attack across the Ugandan border in October 1990 by the RPF,
numbers could be put to better use in other locations rather than taking
over the Bosnian Serb positions outside Sarajevo." BOULDEN, supra note 34,
at 102.
83. See Repor of the Secretary-Ge-neral Pursuant to Resolution 959 (1994), supra
note 54, 16.
84. See Srebrenica Repopt, supra note 58, 468 (stating that "the Bosnian
Serb forces ignored the Security Council, pushed aside the UNPROFOR
troops, and assessed correctly that air power would not be used to stop
them").
85. See Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Iorce in a United Nations Peace-Keeping
Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
312, 319 (1995).
86. See Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 482.
87. See BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 105.
88. Jeport of the Secretay-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959
(1994), supra note 54, 27.
89. See id. 55 ("[1O]nly the consent and cooperation of the parties can
guarantee the protection of the safe areas with a minimal UNPROFOR troop
presence.").
90. This analysis will focus on attempts to create a strengthened version
of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda I (UNAMIR I) force,
from the authorization of UNAMIR II on Ma' 17, 1994, until the decision to
authorize the deployment of the French-led "Operation Turquoise." During
this period, even after its deployment had been authorized, UNAMIR II
remained a force only on paper, though it was subsequently deployed.
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a force consisting mainly of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda.91
On August 4, 1993, the Government and the RPF signed the
Arusha Peace Agreement, which envisaged a role for the
United Nations in the supervision of its implementation. 92 In
October, UNAMIR was established, with an authorized troop
level of 2,500.93 On April 6, 1994, an aircraft carrying the pres-
idents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed in Kigali, killing every-
one on board.94 In Christine Gray's words, the country "sank
into conflict,"95 with "terrible massacres of Tutsis and moder-
ate Hutus by supporters of the Rwandan government."9 6 On
April 21, the Security Council reduced UNAMIR to some 270
personnel. 97 At the end of April, however, the Secretary-Gen-
eral recommended a reversal of the reduction,9 8 and on May
17, 1994, after six weeks of killing and the death of 300,000
Rwandans, 99 the Security Council authorized an expansion of
the U.N.'s mandate and size to form a new operation,
UNAMIR 11. l 011
91. See United Nations, Rwanda-UNAMIR, Background, at http://
www,".un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/comission/unanirF-T.htm#HISTORICAL
(last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
92. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations dur-
ing the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Enclosure, at 6, U.N.
Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999), available at http://ww.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/
1999/1257e.pdf [hereinafter Independent Inquiy]; Peace Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (Aug. 4, 1993), available at http:/I129.194.252.80/cattiles/2403.pdf.
93. See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 102-103, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/49 (1994). In addition to monitoring the cease-fire, its mandate in-
chided contributing to the security of Kigali. Id. at 102.
94. See Rwanda-UAMIR, supra note 91, at http://www.un.org/ depts/
dpko/dpko/conission/unanirFT.htn#APRIL.
95. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAN', AND THE USE OF FORCE 175
(2000). "[B]etween 500,000 and a million people were killed in three
months." Id.
96. Id.
97. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50
(1996). According to an adjusted mandate, UNAMIR would "act as an inter-
mediary between the parties ...; ... assist in the resumption of humanita-
rian relief operations to the extent feasible; . .. [and] monitor .. .develop-
ments." Id. at 4.
98. Independent Inquiy, supra note 92, at 22.
99. ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MN NEIGHBOR'S HOUSE 126 (2001).
100. See S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/918 (1994).
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2. Mandate & Means
The mandated tasks of UNAMIR II included "within the
limits of the resources available to it":
(a) To contribute to the security and protection of dis-
placed persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in Rwanda, in-
cluding through the establishment and maintenance, where
feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and
(b) To provide security and support for the distribution
of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.l01
Resolution 918 authorized a force of 5,500, but its deploy-
ment was to be phased. The first phase would include 150 un-
armed observers and a battalion of 800 men to secure the air-
port. 10 2 Authorization for the subsequent phase was depen-
dent on a report detailing the cooperation of the parties, the
duration of the mandate, and the availability of
peacekeepers.10 3
3. Failure to Implement
ByJune 20, 1994, no deployment of the additional author-
ized troops had occurred. 114 In light of his assessment that the
lack of troops and equipment might leave UNAMIR unable to
undertake fully the new tasks entrusted to it for another three
months,u05 and with growing evidence of the scale of the disas-
101. Id.
102. Id. 5 (authorizing a force of 5,500); Tnrid Laegreid, U.N. Peacekeep-
ing in Rwanda, in T1HE PATIi- OF A GENOCIDE: TH-E RWANDA CRISIS FROM
U.ANDA 10 ZAIRE 231, 245 (Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds., 1999)
(noting that the first phase would include 150 observers and an 800-man
battalion).
103. Cff id. 7.
104. RAMSBOTlAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 18, at 215. In the words of
one Security Council representative, the Secretary-General had made "ago-
nized efforts . . . to find these 5,500 troops, to agree on their arms and
equipment, and to work out logistics, transportation and the manner of
their deployment once on the scene." U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at
3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994) (statement of Mr. Olhaye, Djibouti).
105. The Secretary-General had received troop offers from 9 African
countries, totaling 5 battalions and 4 companies, and equipment offers from
5 Western countries, totaling 2 aircraft, 50 trucks, and 50 APCs. See Letter
Dated 19June 1994from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Secur-
ity Council, U.N. SCOR, 6, U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994).
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ter, 106 the Secretary-General suggested that the Security Coun-
cil consider France's offer to lead a multinational operation
under Chapter VII. 10 7 Despite grave concerns about the im-
partiality of the French forces, 0 8 and the strong opposition of
the RPF, 10 9 this authorization was given on June 22, 1994.110
4. Assessment
There are indications that with the number of troops au-
thorized, much could have been done to provide security and
protection. Adelman and Suhrke state that "[i] t is reasonable
to assume that UNAMIR II, if quickly and effectively deployed,
could have had a significant impact in terms of saving lives,"' 1 I
noting that even modest efforts had proven significant deter-
rents, including the protection of several thousand persons in-
side a Kigali stadium by twelve lightly armed U.N.
peacekeepers and barbed wire.'12 General Dallaire, Com-
mander of UNAMIR, estimated that the U.N. force had saved
about 25,000 lives in Kigali, 1 3 and his success there convinced
him that the same could have been done throughout Rwanda
if an international force of sufficient size and mobility had
106. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 323, 364-65 (1996).
107. Letter Dated 19June 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, supra note 105, 12.
108. Stephen T. Ostrowski, Preventive Deployment of Troops as Preventive Mea-
sures: Macedonia and Beyond, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 793, 872 (1998).
The Council authorized French intervention "despite grave misgivings about
French neutrality" because it was "the only offer on the table."Julia Preston,
U.N. Supports France on Force for Rwanda, WASH. POST, June 23, 1994, at A24.
109. The RPF "was suspicious of French motives in acting, given the long
history of support provided by France to the Rwandan government." Ostrow-
ski, supra note 108, at 872 n.310.
110. See S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 10-11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
50 (1996).
111. Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke, Study Two: Early Warning and Con-
flict Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CONFLICT AND GENO-
CIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE, Ch. 5 (Steering Committee of
the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book2/pb021.html.
112. Id.
113. J. Matthew Vaccaro, The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Rwanda,
in UN PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND TIlE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE
1990s 367, 384 (WilliamJ. Durch ed., 1996) [hereinafter UN PEACEKEEPING].
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been available. 1 4 Others note the fact that the killings were
primarily committed with low-technology weapons, " 5 and that
"[s] ince the civilians mostly were not threatened by organized,
well-equipped army units (as in Bosnia), but mainly by
paramilitary gangs and mobs, a relatively modest force could
have [had] a significant deterrent effect."' 16
However, the necessary conditions mentioned by Adel-
man and Suhrke-quick and effective deployment-could not
be met.' 17 By largely refusing to commit troops themselves,
and turning exclusively to Africa for contributions, 1 ' the Se-
curity Council members made quick and effective deployment
highly unlikely, since poorly equipped troops required notjust
equipment" 9 but also training in how to use it. 120 Ironically,
114. Id. at 397.
115. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH T-1O INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 3 (1998) ("the
killing was low-tech-performed largely by machete").
116. J. TEBBS, RWANDA, WAR AND PEA.XCE?! 138 (1999). See also Charles Pe-
trie, The Role of the International Communitv, in GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A COL-
LECTIVE MEMORY 149, 151 (John A. Berry & Carol Pott Berry eds., 1999) ("It
would have been very easy to intervene, but no one did so until it was too
late.").
117. The necessity for rapid deployment was also stated in the Secretary-
General's plan for the mission. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 32, U.N. Doc. S/1994/565 (13 May 1994) ("[l]n
order for UNAMIR II to attain its objective, there can be no delay in its
deployment.").
118. On April 30, 1994, following consultations among Council members,
the Security Council President made a statement requesting "the Secretary-
General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU and coun-
tries of the region, to take appropriate measures to ensure that international
efforts to assist the situation in Rwanda are carried out in an effective and
coordinated manner." Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/21, at 2 (1994).
119. HILLEN, supra note 20, at 155 ("reliable logistics, medical, engineer,
communications, transportation, and aviation units are largely restricted to
First World countries"). The Secretary-General, in his report of May 31,
1994, expressed his gratitude to Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and
Zimbabwe, for their offers of troops but stated that they "cannot be dis-
patched until the proper equipment is provided by other Governments." Re-
port of the Secretaiy-General on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 40, U.N.
Doc. S/1994/640 (31 May 1994). "[T]he Department of Peace-keeping Op-
erations was required to identify sources of equipment and to arrange for its
transport to Rwanda-a cumbersome process that significantly delayed de-
ployment." UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA: 1993-1996
50-51 (1996).
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the resolution that called on Member States to contribute
troops12' simultaneously deterred them from doing so by
phasing deployment. At the insistence of the United States,
Resolution 918 envisaged phased deployment.1 22 The pro-
posed separation of phases 1 and 2 later became moot when
the Security Council followed the Secretary-General's recom-
mendation that "[b]ecause of the projected long delay in de-
ploying the troops and equipment for phase 1, phase 2 should
be initiated immediately, in close synchronization with phase
1."123 One Security Council Representative believes that the
abandonment of full deployment in favor of phases discour-
aged potential troop contributors: "[T]he tentativeness dis-
played by the Council in adopting resolution 918 sent a very
confused signal, both to potential troop-contributing coun-
tries and others, about the Council's commitment to the idea
of an expanded UNAMIR."'124 This signal delayed and de-
terred countries' participation.12 5
120. See Ruth Wedgwood, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use
of Force, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 69 81 (2001) ("Even if equipment had been
immediately supplied, unfamiliar troops still needed to be trained in its op-
eration.").
121. Resolution 918 "[i]nvites Member States to respond promptly to the
Secretary-General's request for the resources required." S.C. Res. 918, supra
note 100, 9.
122. See Laegreid, supra note 102, at 245.
123. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda (31 May 1994),
supra note 119, 23. Resolution 925 ofJune 8, 1994, endorsed the Secretary-
General's proposals for "[t] he immediate initiation of the deployment of the
two additional battalions in phase 2 in close synchronization with phase I"
and "[t]he continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the
two battalions envisaged for phase 3." S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1996).
124. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3388th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3388
(statement of Mr. Keating, New Zealand) (referring to the "orange light"
that this resolution gave to potential troop contributors).
125. Id.
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E. UNAMSIL12 6
1. Introduction
Fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in-
vaded Sierra Leone in March 1991.127 Sierra Leone's army ini-
tially tried to defend the government, but in April 1992 the
army itself overthrew the government.12 8 Elections were held
in February 1996, and the army relinquished power to the win-
ner, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. 129 In November 1996, Kab-
bah and Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, signed the Abidjan
Accord, but the peace agreement was derailed by another
coup d'6tat in May 1997.13 11 Major Johnny Paul Koroma as-
sumed power as chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), and Kabbah fled to Guinea.'3 1 On June 1,
Koroma invited the RUF to join the junta, and formed the
AFRC ruling council.' 3 2 In February 1998, the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), launched an attack that led to the collapse of the
junta, and in March, Kabbah was returned to office.' On
July 13, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL) was established, with an authorized strength of
70 military observers.' 34
Fighting continued, and in January 1999, the rebel alli-
ance entered and overran most of Freetown.13 5 Later the
same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and reinstal-
126. This analysis will focus on the "crisis" that faced the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in the period beginning May 1, 2000.
127. JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY 114 (2001).
128. See id. at 115.
129. See id. at 42-46, 117.
130. See id. at 51-54, 56-58.
131. See id. at 57-58.
132. See id. at 57-61.
133. See id. at 65, 71.
134. S.C. Res. 1181, U.N. SCOR, 3902d mtg. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181
(1998). The force was mandated to monitor the military and security situa-
tion, disarmament and demobilization, and respect for international hu-
manitarian law. Id.
135. United Nations, Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Background, at http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003); see also Huzsch, supra note 127, at 125.
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led the civilian government. 13 6 On July 7, Kabbah and Sankoh
signed the Lom6 Peace Agreement, providing for an end to
hostilities, the formation of a government of national unity,
and requiring that the rebels disarm and demobilize. 137 The
agreement called for a "neutral peacekeeping force compris-
ing UNOMSIL and ECOMOG, '"13 8 and requested that the Se-
curity Council amend UNOMSIL's mandate to accommodate
its new responsibilities.' 3 9 Accordingly, on October 22, 1999,
the Security Council authorized UNAMSIL, a mission with a
maximum of 6,000 military personnel, to assist in the imple-
mentation of the agreement. 141
2. Mandate & Means
At its establishment, UNAMSIL's tasks included:
* "[t]o assist the Government ... in the implementation
of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
* [tlo that end, to establish a presence at key locations
throughout the [country], including at disarmament/recep-
tion centres and demobilization centres;
9 [t]o ensure the security and freedom of movement of
United Nations personnel."' 14 1
In Resolution 1289 of February 7, 2000, following the an-
nouncement that ECOMOG, which had previously provided
security in Freetown and Lungi, was losing its Nigerian,
Guinean and Ghanaian contingents, the Security Council ex-
panded the force to 11,100 military personnel and, acting
under Chapter VII, included within its mandate various addi-
tional tasks, including the provision of security at all sites of
136. Id. "The number of E.C.O.M.O.G. forces at the end of 1999 stood
between 10,000 and 15,000." Babafemi Akinrinade, International Humanita-
rian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'v 391, 405 (2001).
137. Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Background, supra note 135; Peace Agreee-
ment between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, at http://www.sierra-leone.org/
lomeaccord.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
138. See id. art. XVI.
139. See id. art. XIV.
140. See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg. 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1270 (1999).
141. Jd. 8. The force was authorized, under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, to "take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of
movement of its personnel." Id. 14.
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the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration pro-
gram. 142
3. Failure to Implement
UNAMSIL's period of crisis began on May 1, 2000, at the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration reception
center at Makeni, where RUF combatants detained three U.N.
military observers and four U.N. peacekeepers before proceed-
ing to destroy part of the camp. The U.N. compound in
nearby Magburaka was also attacked by the RUF. 143 On May 4,
2000, 208 troops sent to relieve Kenyan peacekeepers in
Makeni were captured, and on May 6 another contingent of
226 Zambians surrendered, taking the total number of hos-
tages held by the RUF to some 500. 14 4
The events of May 2000 demonstrated UNAMSIL's inabil-
ity to succeed in its tasks of providing security at all sites of the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, and
ensuring the security and freedom of movement of U.N. per-
sonnel. They also resulted in further failures to implement
the mandate, since the May hostilities caused the disarmament
process, which, in the words of the Secretary-General, had
been making "slow but steady progress,"' 45 to come to a
halt. 146
4. Assessment
For the majority of UNAMSIL's deployment, the number
of troops on the ground lagged behind the number author-
ized. Indeed, the gap between authorized and deployed troop
levels was greatest in the period just prior to the RUF attacks,
142. See S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg. 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1289 (2000). UNAMSIL was authorized, again tinder Chapter VII, to
take "the necessary action" to fulfill its tasks. Id. 10.
143. Sierra Leone: Breakdown of Peace Agreement, KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD
EVENTs (May 2000).
144. Id.
145. Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Si-
erra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 26, U.N. Doc. S/2000/455 (2000). The
RUF had destroyed two demobilization centers and operations were sus-
pended at four others. See Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
lions Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 32, U.N. Doc. S/2000/
751 (2000).
146. See id.
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with an authorization of 11,100 on February 7, 2000, but only
7,391 deployed by March 1, 2000.147 Yet the Secretary-Gen-
eral's response to the attacks suggests a belief that the author-
ized number of troops, even if fully deployed, would have been
insufficient. The weaknesses revealed by the hostage crisis led
him to request that the number and mandate of the
peacekeeping troops be increased and expanded. t 4 On May
19, he told the Security Council that, in response to the at-
tacks, it seemed necessary not only to accelerate deployment
in order to reach the authorized level of 11,100, but also to
exceed the authorized level.' 49 Such was the urgency of the
need for additional troops that he proceeded with deployment
that would increase the number of UNAMSIL military person-
nel to 13,000. -150 He expected that UNAMSIL's authorized
strength would be exceeded within a few days15 ' and therefore
stated that the Security Council might "wish to consider taking
appropriate steps to authorize the interim expansion" of the
U.N. force. 152 The Council complied with the suggestion two
days later, expanding UNAMSIL's authorized troop level to
13,000.153 It was not until the authorized strength of UNAM-
SIL had been further increased to 17,500 that the Security
Council approved a resumption of the provision of security by
UNAMSIL at disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
147. See S.C. Res. 1289, supra note 142, 9 (expanding UNAMSIL to
11,100 military personnel); Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 16, U.N. Doc. S/2000/
186 (2000) (noting that 7,391 troops comprised the military component of
UNAMSIL as of March 1, 2000).
148. Laura Forest, Note, Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establishing a
Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control over the Country's Diamond Re-
sources, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 633, 644 (2001).
149. See Letter Dated 17 May 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the





153. S.C. Res. 1299, U.N. SCOR, 4145th mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1299
(2000). It gave the justification that "the deterioration in security conditions
on the ground necessitates the rapid reinforcement of the military compo-
nent" in order "to provide the mission with additional resources to fulfil
[sic] its mandate." Id. para. 4.
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sites, 154 a duty that, after the kidnappings, had been omitted
from the revised list of UNAMSIL's "priority tasks."'155
III. WARNING SIGNS DISREGARDED?
In each of these operations, warning signs indicated ei-
ther that the consent and cooperation on which the authoriza-
tion of small numbers of troops was based would not be forth-
coming or that the authorized number of troops was not likely
to be provided with any speed. It is not just hindsight that
leads to the conclusion that the Security Council's decisions
were taken in the face of, rather than in ignorance of, these
warnings.
A. Croatia
The Security Council was prompted to authorize the es-
tablishment of UNPROFOR in Croatia by a Secretary-Gen-
eral's Report outlining a plan that relied on the cooperation
of the parties, 511 despite the fact that the report also referred
to "a number of unanswered questions" about the level of co-
operation that UNPROFOR would actually enjoy.' 57 The an-
swers were obvious after the deployment of the force, 58 which
according to Barry Ashton was "passively and actively ob-
structed, undermined, and opposed,"' 5 9 but they should have
154. See S.C. Res. 1346, U.N. SCOR, 4306th mtg. 1-2, 12 (Mar. 30,
2001), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346 (2001).
155. See S.C. Res. 1313, U.N. SCOR, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1313 (2000).
Instead, the role envisaged for UNAMSIL in this area was one that did not
require the use or threat of force, namely "[t]o assist in the promotion of the
political process leading, inter alia, to a renewed disarmament, demobiliza-
tion and reintegration programme, where possible." Id. 3(e).
156. The UNPA idea required "clear and unconditional acceptance of the
plan by all concerned, with equally clear assurances of their readiness to
cooperate in its implementation." Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), U.N. SCOR, 28, U.N. Doc. S/
23592 (1992).
157. Id.
158. Indeed, in his report of May 15, 1993, the Secretary-General, refer-
ring to his earlier comment, stated that "[d]evelopments since then have
done little to alleviate my original apprehension." Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 815 (1993), supra note 16, 18.
159. Barry Ashton, Making Peace Agreements Work: United Nations Experience
in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 769, 776 (1997). Clemons con-
cludes that "to say that when UNPROFOR troops were finally deployed it was
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been apparent prior to the authorization. While UNPROFOR
was being planned, Croatian President Tudjman was raising
questions, several of which were substantive and fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the plan. 16 11 Meanwhile, Milan Babic,
the leader of one of the UNPAs, was objecting to the substitu-
tion of UNPROFOR for the Serb-controlled Yugoslav army,16
convinced that this would lead to the restoration of Croat con-
trol.16 2 Though the Secretary-General recognized that the
plan was endangered by these unresolved concerns, 16 " he de-
cided to accept Tudjman's positive assurances in good faith 164
and recommend the operation despite Babic's objections.1 65
The Security Council adopted the unrealistic notion that the
United Nations could provide protection in the midst of con-
tinuing conflict 66 and authorized 14,000 troops despite the
recommendation that 40,000 would be required to implement
the Vance plan. 167
B. Somalia
In Somalia, the Security Council authorized a security
force of 500 peacekeepers despite the fact that the Secretary-
General's Report outlining the concept portrayed an environ-
ment that was far from cooperative. Given the report's refer-
with the consent and cooperation of the parties would be a vast overstate-
ment." Clemons, supra note 12, at 126. See also Christine Gray, Host-State Con-
sent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
241, 270 (1996) (stating that the initial consent to the establishment of UN-
PROFOR was "grudgingly given," and "[t]he early problems in securing the
consent of 'the concerned parties' to the deployment of UNPROFOR in Yu-
goslavia were ominous, and the Secretary-General's fears that the force
would not be able to operate effectively without the cooperation of all those
involved proved prophetic").
160. Further Report of the Secretaiy-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 721 (1991), supra note 156, 6.
161. Clemons, supra note 12, at 125-26.
162. TANNER, supra note 5, at 280.
163. See Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Reso-
lution 721 (1991), supra note 156, 1 6, 8.
164. Id. 6.
165. Id. 8.
166. See William J. Durch & James A. Schear, Faultlines: UN Operations in
the Former Yugoslavia, in UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 113, at 193, 211.
167. Interview with a staff member at the Executive Office of the Secre-
tary-General, supra note 64.
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ences to widespread banditry, 168 Thomas Mockaitis queries
how the Secretary-General could have believed that 500 lightly
armed peacekeepers would be able to ensure the mission's
safety and prevent the looting of relief supplies, which "inevita-
bly occurred,"16 9 and states that the report should have raised
"serious questions" about how such a small force could fulfill
its mandate.' 17  The report, while outlining the force's
planned areas of operation-the port and airports in Mogad-
ishu-noted that activities at the port and elsewhere were
under threat from armed elements, many of which were under
the command of neither main faction.'17  Indeed, while a
ceasefire agreement providing for a U.N. monitoring role had
been signed on March 3, 1992, it involved only the two main
parties in Mogadishu, whereas there were more than a dozen
factional leaders involved in the conflict. 1 72 Despite all this,
the Security Council, in the words of one representative, felt
"confident that it was possible to act in a conventional man-
ner;"'173 as Christine Gray puts it, the peacekeepers were
deployed "even though there was no peace to keep."'1 74
C. Bosnia
In the words of Michael Scharf, the Security Council "irre-
sponsibly chose a light option" for Bosnia.' 75 The "light op-
tion" relied on the cooperation of the parties, despite indica-
168. See, e.g., The Situation in Somalia, supra note 32, 56.
169. THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS, PEACE OPERATIONS AND IN[RASTATE CONFLICT:
THE SWORD OR THE OLIVE BRANcHI? 53 (1999).
170. Id., at 52-53. See Clark, supra note 41, at 222 ("Exactly what the Secur-
ity Council imagined 500 peacekeepers with a vague but limited mandate
would be able to accomplish in the midst of the violence then wracking
Somalia remains unclear.").
171. See The Situation in Somalia, supra note 32, 28.
172. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 28, at 25. "The Security Council authorized
the deployment of troops to secure delivery of humanitarian assistance, not
only without consent of any government entity, but also without the consent
of the fighting factions." Effects of the New World Order on the Third World, 87
Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 37, 40 (1993) (remarks by Gay McDougal).
173. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3145
(statement of Mr. Arria, Venezuela) (adding "This has not been the case
. . . . ").
174. GRAY, supra note 95, at 169.
175. Remarks by Michael P. Scharf, in Protecting Minorities: Lessons of Inter-
national Peacekeeping, 91 AM. SoC's INT'L L. PROC. 429, 440 (1997).
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tions from the Bosnian Serbs' past behavior and from military
opinions that this approach would be ineffective. According
to Barry Ashton, such cooperation "had not existed elsewhere
and it was clear early that it would not exist for the 'safe ar-
eas."' 176 In Srebrenica, for example, the Security Council's
earlier resolution, 177 which invoked Chapter VII to demand
that all parties should create and respect a "safe area," had
achieved little more than a temporary break from the shelling
while the Serbs turned to other targets. 178 The subsequent
drafting of Resolution 836 led one Security Council Represen-
tative to state that "in this conflict there has not been the firm
determination to face reality." 179 The Secretary-General has
described this flight from reality: "[W]e tried to keep the
peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no
peace to keep .... [W]e tried to create-or imagine-an envi-
ronment in which the tenets of peacekeeping-agreement be-
tween the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality-
could be upheld."' 8 0 The Security Council ignored warnings
that the authorized number of troops would be insufficient,' 8 '
and according to Jane Boulden, the difference between the
authorized 7,600 and the recommended 34,000 suggests that
the fall of the "safe areas" was "entirely predictable."' l 2 In the
176. Ashton, supra note 159, at 774. See Srebrenica Report, supra note 58,
499 (stating that "[t]he safe areas were established by the Security Council
without the consent of the parties... "). One Security Council representa-
tive voiced his doubts in a statement following the adoption of Resolution
844, stating that "the effective implementation of the provisions of the reso-
lution just adopted [would] depend upon the consent and cooperation of
the parties-an element that remains less than certain .... ." U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3241st mtg. at 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3241 (1993) (statement of Mr.
de Araujo Castro, Brazil) (emphasis added).
177. S.C. Res. 819, supra note 47, 1 (demanding that "all parties and
others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which
should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act").
178. BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 93.
179. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3228
(1993) (statement of Mr. Arria, Venezuela).
180. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 488 (emphasis added).
181. See Ashton, supra note 159, at 780.
182. BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 113. One UNPROFOR Force Commander
believes that the "responsibility [for Srebrenica] ... lies in the Security
Council's decision not to accept the military evaluation which stated that
some 35,000 soldiers would be needed to implement the new mission to
establish Safe Areas." Bertrand de Lapresle, Principles to be Observed for the Use
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words of the U.N. deputy force commander in Zagreb, "There
was no doubt from the beginning that the safe area concept
was unworkable, and that the UN Security Council knew it."' 8 3
The "safe area" policy involved a second flight from real-
ity: The Security Council exhibited an apparent unwillingness
to acknowledge that Member States would not supply addi-
tional troops to carry out this dangerous mandate. 1 4 Two
countries abstained from the vote approving Resolution 836,
including Venezuela, whose representative criticized the draft
because "it could not be implemented without substantial re-
sources which might not be forthcoming."'18 5 He stated that
he had asked the resolution's proponents to wait for a report
by the Secretary-General "on the means he has and, above all,
the means he would need to implement the resolution on safe
of Military Forces Aimed at De-escalation and Resolution of Conflict, in UN
PEACEKEEPING IN TROUBLE, supra note 9, at 137, 148-49. Further indications
that substantial numbers of troops would be necessary were given by the
Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser during Security Council consul-
tations of May 5. In response to the draft version of what was to become
Resolution 824, he stated that "UNPROFOR could not be expected to take
on this additional responsibility within its existing resources and that it
would need at least one brigade in each town declared a safe area. Quite
simply, he concluded, the Secretary-General did not have the means to im-
plement the draft resolution." Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 66. See also
Prager, supra note 62 ("Even in purely military terms, the safe-haven resolu-
tions demanded the impossible. MacKenzie [a Canadian commander of
UN's Sarajevo Sector] thought the task would require 100,000 soldiers. His
successor, the French General Philippe Morillon, suggested that 75,000
might suffice. Boutros-Ghali eventually asked the Security Council for
34,000. It authorized 7,600 .... ).
183. NEUFFER, supra note 99, at 134 (quotingJohn MacInnis). Similarly,
the U.N. Force Commander stated that "under pressure of a political imper-
ative to be seen to 'do something,' the Security Council entrusted UN-
PROFOR with a mandate that it knew, or should have known, was not only
unrealistic, but impossible to implement." Akashi, supra note 85, at 315. At
the Security Council meeting at which resolution 836 was approved, the rep-
resentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina "noted that the informal working pa-
per presented by the Secretariat had characterized the implementation of
the safe area policy as *not realistically possible.' He stated that the resolu-
tion appeared to be 'diplomatic cover for some of its co-sponsors to mitigate
the need and responsibility for more resolute and comprehensive mea-
sures. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 1 81.
184. See Ashton, supra note 159, at 779 (stating that this is one of "[a]
number of UNPROFOR's failures and problems [that] can be traced to the
Security Council").
185. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 83.
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areas," s" but that they had "decided to ignore the request on
which our vote now depends." 8 7 The sponsors, aware that
they would not provide troops for the operation that they were
mandating, 8 8  cherished an unrealistic hope that others
would. 8)
D. Rwanda
In the case of Rwanda, the Security Council authorized
the force described in a Secretary-General's Report as one
whose deployment would "have to be carried out rapidly,"190
despite the fact that there were clear indications that its rapid
deployment would be impossible. According to Michael Bar-
nett, "this was a document that looked good on paper but
never had much of chance of being implemented .... Mem-
ber states weren't going to provide the resources to carry out
that plan."' 9' The Security Council voted to increase the
troop level to 5,500 but had obtained no commitments from
member states to provide these soldiers. 9 2 Arthur Klinghof-
fer's suggestion that "Resolution 918 was largely a delaying tac-
186. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., supra note 179, at 15.
187. Id. at 16.
188. See Berdal, supra note 57, at 82-83; SHAWCROSS, supra note 36, at 110
("In terms of the Bosnian safe areas it was.., extraordinary that for many
members of the Security Council adoption of the resolution was enough.
Implementation was a detail with which they seemed less concerned.").
189. Boulden notes the two ways in which Security Council actions appear
to have been unrealistic. The "safe area" policy was "dependent on the com-
pliance of the warring parties and the willingness of the international com-
munity to provide sufficient troops and resources for implementation.
Neither condition was forthcoming, nor, it could be argued, was there a rea-
sonable expectation of either condition being met at the time the mandates
were passed." BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 115.
190. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda ( 13 May 1994),
supra note 117, 23.
191. Organization of African Unity, International Panel of Eminent Personali-
ties to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, at
15.25 (July 7, 2000), available at http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/
ipep.htm [hereinafter "OAU Report"] (quoting Michael Barnett). Indeed,
in calling for "forceful action" the Secretary-General acknowledged the re-
quirement of a "commitment of human and material resources on a scale
which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate." Letter
Dated 29 April 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Se-
curily Council, U.N. SCOR, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1994/518 (1994).
192. Tes6n, supra note 106, at 363.
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tic, encouraged by the US, to deflect criticisms regarding UN
inaction,"'93 rather than a plan that had any realistic chance of
being implemented, is echoed in the OAU's claim that "the
members of the Security Council consciously chose to abdicate
their responsibility for Rwanda."' 94 If rapid deployment was to
have been a realistic prospect, self-sufficient units that did not
require the time-consuming provision of equipment and train-
ing would have been necessary. Yet according to J. Tebbs, the
unwillingness of the major powers to contribute troops to an
expanded U.N. force had been "clear in the decision to scale
down UNAMIR I and was reiterated in early May when
UNAMIR II was planned."'9 5 Similarly, U.S. participation
would be vital,' 96 but in the words of Elizabeth Neuffer, the
United States "made it clear it was determined not to inter-
vene." 197 The genocide began shortly after the U.S.' bitter ex-
perience in Somalia, and during the last phase of the drafting
of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which strictly
limited U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping, 198 with, as Philip
193. ARTHUR JAN, Ki.INGtlOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENO-
CII)F IN RWANDA 52 (1998).
194. OAU Report, supra note 191, at 13.1.
195. TEBBS, supra note 116, at 135 (adding that the resultant need to estab-
lish the force on a "mix-and-match basis" was "extremely time-consuming
even under the best of circumstances"). See also Ki-INGHOFFER, supra note
193, at 51 ("It was evident that European states were ... not prepared to
commit troops to Rwanda.").
196. See Scott Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have
Succeeded in RIwanda, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, 1 60 (April 1998), at http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/
rwanda/rwanda.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) ("[A] ny peacekeeping force
would have to depend on sophisticated transportation and logistics capabili-
ties, which are maintained by few nations in the world. For this operation,
conference panelists observed, the participation of the United States would
be crucial.").
197. NEUFFER, supra note 99, at 123.
198. See TEBBS, supra note 116, at 135-36 ("To support UN peacekeeping
in Rwanda, the Administration would have to determine that peace in this
remote Central African country was critical to US national interests. In con-
ventional strategic terms, this would be difficult, and the Administration did
not try."). Though Boutros-Ghali referred to genocide, his words "fell on the
deaf hears [sic] of Albright's crew, which had bee [sic] stuffed with PDD 25
lest they succumb to the siren song of assertive multilateralism." Ian Wil-
liams, Boutros-Ghali Bites Back: A Review of Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga,
THE NATION, June 14, 1999, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/pastsg/
bg99-I.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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Gourevitch puts it, "what Washington policymakers call 'lan-
guage' urging that the United States should persuade others
not to undertake the missions that it wished to avoid."'199
UNAMIR's proposed expansion became an opportunity to ap-
ply this doctrine for the first time. 20 0 The indications of
United States opposition should have been particularly omi-
nous, given the United States' dominant role in the Security
Council.20 1
E. Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, according toJohn Hirsch, "[p]lanning in
the UN Secretariat was based on the flawed assumption, de-
spite numerous indications to the contrary, that the RUF in-
tended to cooperate in carrying out the Lom6 peace agree-
ment's disarmament and demobilisation provisions. '" 2 1 2 Paul
Richards believes that the RUF's past behavior should have ex-
posed this error: "[I] ts history and mentality are different, and
strongly sectarian. Like so many sectarian movements, it wants
either the moon, or martyrdom. ' 20 3 The RUF had a history of
signing agreements that it subsequently violated, 20 4 including
the Abidjan agreement, whose terms were very similar to those
of Lom6 and which rapidly collapsed. 20 5 Despite early indica-
tions that the RUF would not voluntarily disarm and demobil-
ize, a feeble and inadequately equipped group of soldiers from
the developing world was deployed.2 °16 In Sierra Leone, ac-
cording to Ralph Peters, we "pa[id] the price for our prefer-
199. GOUREVITCH, supra note 115, at 150.
200. Laegreid, supra note 102, at 245 ("The U.S. conditionality, which
dominated the whole process of establishing the expanded operation, was a
direct consequence" of PDD 25.).
201. See NEUFFER, supra note 99, at 123.
202. John L. Hirsch, War in Sierra Leone, SURVIVAL, Autumn 2001, at 145,
157.
203. Paul Richards, War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 25.2 FLLTCHER F. OF
WORLD AnF. 41, 47 (2001).
204. See Stephen Ellis, War in West Africa, in FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF.
supra note 203, at 33, 37.
205. See Richards, supra note 203, at 45. "The Lom6 agreement was less
than a year old when, like the Abidjan peace, it broke down in renewed
fighting." Id. at 46.
206. SeeJames Traub, The Worst Place on Earth, N.Y. Riv. OF BOOKS Uune
29, 2000), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/43 ("India was the
only country with a genuinely professional army that was willing to send
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ence for a comforting fantasy of mankind's nobility over brute
human reality."20 7
Warning signs existed not only with respect to the lack of
agreement between the parties, but also with respect to the
level of consent towards the United Nations. In mid-January
2000, the RUF had ambushed a U.N. convoy of Guinean
soldiers and two detachments of Kenyans. 20 And yet, as the
Secretary-General admits, the Security Council's actions
seemed suited to a different reality, since the troop level au-
thorized by Resolution 1289, less than a month after the Janu-
ary ambush, was "predicated on the cooperation of the parties
and a generally permissive environment. '" 20 9 Sankoh began to
test the peacekeepers shortly after their arrival,210 and troop
levels were not increased sufficiently in response. According
to John Hirsch, it took the crisis of May 2000 to bring "to the
fore all the doubts and forebodings about the RUF's inten-
tions."211
Thus, Security Council decisions did not respond to the
unlikelihood that the RUF would cooperate with the govern-
ment or with the United Nations: In the view ofJames Traub,
it was "at least as absurd to believe that Sankoh would be satis-
fied by power-sharing as to believe that the RUF could be con-
quered by a campaign of friendly persuasion, or that the rebels
troops. The others were drawn from the ECOMOG forces already on the
ground - Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea - as well as Kenya.").
207. Ralph Peters, Sierra Leone's Blood is on America's Hands, WALL ST. J.,
May 11, 2000, at A26.
208. Traub, supra note 206. On February 23, 2000, a convoy of the Indian
battalion was blocked from traveling from Kenema to Daru by hundreds of
well-armed RUF fighters. "In retrospect, it is now obvious that the roadblock
.. . was part of a larger pattern of testing and prodding, and that Foday
Sankoh had learned what he needed to know: that the peacekeepers, unlike
the ECOMOG forces, would not shoot back if provoked." Id.
209. Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Si-
erra Leone, supra note 145, 83 (acknowledging that "this crucial condition
. . . is . . . lacking"); see also Interview with John L. Hirsch, Senior Fellow,
International Peace Academy, in New York (Nov. 12, 2001) (The Security
Council set up UNAMSIL "on the assumption that it would not face much
resistance.").
210. See Traub, supra note 206.
211. HIRSCH, Supra note 127, at 87.
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would be intimidated by the peacekeepers' modest show of
force."2 12
IV. CHANGE WITHIN THE U.N. SYSTEM
Given that these operations were authorized in the face of
clear warnings that their allocated troop levels would be inade-
quate, or would not be made rapidly available, it appears that a
lack of information is not the most pressing problem facing
U.N. peacekeeping. Rather, it seems that the system needs to
be altered so as to avoid resolutions that make unrealistic de-
mands or promises. Part A will examine various changes that
have been suggested to ensure that mandates receive the au-
thorized number of troops; Part B will examine those that
have been suggested to ensure that resolutions authorize a suf-
ficient number of troops.
A. Avoiding unrealistic demands
Operations would be less likely to falter because of a gap
between the number of troops authorized by a Security Coun-
cil resolution and the number of troops made available if the
Security Council could pass resolutions with the knowledge
that there existed a guaranteed source of troops. Such a
source might be a U.N. force, "on call" for deployment to any
peacekeeping operation; Member States who had pledged
troops to the operation; Security Council members them-
selves; or even private military companies. This section will ex-
amine each of those sources.
1. Help "on call"
Under the original scheme envisaged by the U.N. Char-
ter, the Security Council could have authorized operations
with confidence that the authorized number of troops would
be provided, since Article 43 was designed to create an obliga-
tion on the part of Member States to contribute armed forces
to the United Nations. However, according to David Scheffer,
212. Traub, supra note 206 ("The UN mission in Sierra Leone now looks
like a ludicrous attempt to apply the loftiest set of moral principles in a sadis-
tic and predatory world. It is another case of precisely the kind of ruinous
naivet6 that the UN has been accused of suffering from in Bosnia and
Rwanda.").
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the idea of Article 43 agreements was "stillborn.' ' 21 3 Mandate
failures such as those outlined above have led some to call for
the creation of an alternative, whether in the form of
earmarked troops that would remain in their home countries
or a standing army of volunteers training in one location. 214
Rwanda is cited as a prime example of an operation where the
speed to be gained by a force able to deploy immediately, with-
out delay caused by negotiations over troop reimburse-
ments2 15 or by the need to find adequate equipment and
transportation, would have been invaluable.2t i Rapid deploy-
ment capability would help to protect cease-fires,21 7 and for
this reason would have been welcome in Somalia218 and Croa-
tia.219- However, according to David Malone, the chances of
such a force being created in the foreseeable future are
"zero,"220 since powerful Member States have made their op-
position clear.2 21
213. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 650.
214. See Brian Urquhart, The Case for Rapid Response, in Brian Urquhart and
Francois Heisbourg, Prospects for a Rapid Response Capability: A Dialoguze, in
PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY 189, 194 (Olara A.
Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle eds., 1998).
215. "The need to negotiate rates of reimbursement with troop contribut-
ing countries contributes to the time lag of up to three months until deploy-
ment can occur. In addition, some other country may be needed to trans-
port the troops." Adriaan Verheul, Remarks at International Law Weekend,
supra note 78.
216. See Nanda, supra note 44, at 851 ("The Rwandan tragedy... makes a
powerful case for the creation of a standing U.N. quick-reaction voluntary
force.").
217. See Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Report
of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 86,
312, U.N. Doc. A/55/977 (2001). ("Enhanced rapid deployment capacities
are essential to ensure that peacekeeping operations are on the ground and
able to carry out their mandates before the parties' commitment to a peace
process wanes, so that opportunities are not lost from the beginning.").
218. See Scheffer, supra note 17, at 652 ("In Somalia, the delayed deploy-
ment of UNOSOM I (authorized in August of 1992 for full deployment by
October of that year) handicapped U.N. efforts to prevent deterioration of
the security situation.").
219. See id. ("Delayed deployment of UNPROFOR infantry components
posed a significant risk to the cease-fire in Croatia in early 1992.").
220. Interview with David Malone, President, International Peace Acad-
emy, in New York. (Mar. 13, 2002).
221. Joe Byrnes Sills, United Nations Peacekeeping: The Years Past, The Years
Ahead, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & Pon'y 451, 458 (1996).
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One argument used by critics of the notion of a standing
force is that the United Nations Standby Arrangements System
(UNSAS) is "the closest we can get to a standing army, and
even that doesn't work."2 22 UNSAS may take us one step
nearer to a rapid reaction capability, 223 but it is not yet a de-
pendable resource. 224 The system was launched in the mid-
1990s in order to enhance the U.N.'s rapid deployment capa-
bilities and is, according to the Brahimi Report on United Na-
tions Peace Operations, "a database of military, civilian police
and civilian assets and expertise indicated by Governments to
be available, in theory, for deployment to United Nations
peacekeeping operations ....*"225 The important phrase is "in
theory," since for those seeking a mechanism that will allow
the Security Council to be confident of troop supplies, the cru-
cial drawback of this system is that it still allows countries to say
"no" to any individual operation. 226 Furthermore, "Member
States are saying 'no' to deploying ... military units to U.N.
peacekeeping operations far more often than they are saying
'yes.' "227 Indeed, none of the nineteen countries that had en-
tered into peacekeeping standby agreements prior to the sum-
mer of 1994 was willing to offer troops to meet Rwanda's ur-
gent need. 228 Rather than guaranteeing troop provision, the
222. Verheul, supra note 215.
223. See Progress Report of the Secretay-General on Standby Arrangements for
Peacekeeping, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1999/361, 19 (1999).
224. Report of the Panel on United iVations Peace Operations, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., 84, U.N. Doc. A/55/305 (2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report]. In-
deed, the Secretary-General would find it "preferable to have a much smaller
number of assets listed in the system that are actually available, rather than
having a large figure that is unrealistic or bears little resemblance to what
contributions may actually be made." Report of the Secretary-General on the Imple-
mentation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1081, 79 (2000).
225. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 102.
226. The Memorandum of Understanding between the U.N. and partici-
pating governments specifies that "the final decision whether to actually de-
ploy the resources.., remains a national decision." United Nations, Memo-
randum of Understanding, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/69MOU
Document.html.
227. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 103. The Independent Inquiry into
Rwanda notes that the standby system is "equally dependent on the will of
Member States to commit troops and other personnel in a particular in-
stance." Independent Inquiry, supra note 92, at 44.
228. Urquhart, supra note 214, at 191.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 35:839
"SOLDIERING ON IN HOPE"
system has the potential only to play a more limited role,
namely preventing the Security Council from authorizing an
operation or troop level that is clearly impossible. 229
Even a recent innovation touted as a welcome improve-
ment on the standby system remains subject to failures of polit-
ical will. The Multinational Stand-By High Readiness Brigade
for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) operates in ser-
vice of the United Nations and aims to address the fact that
the United Nations has no rapid deployment capability. Four-
teen countries are participants, and when fully deployed the
brigade comprises 4,000 to 5,000 troops. 2" Again, however,
deployment requires a national decision by each country in
each case,23' and the answer was negative when, for example,
SHIRBRIG's help was sought for Sierra Leone. 212
229. So far, ninety-one Member States have officially expressed their will-
ingness to participate; sixty-eight of these have provided a list of capabilities
specifying the resources they will make available, providing a total of some
148,000 personnel. United Nations, United Nations and Peacekeeping "In the
Service of Peace": Annual Update on the United Nations Standby Arrangements Sys-
tem, 14-15 (Nov 22, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
rapid/anb.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). If the list of those specifying the
resources they will make available could be expanded to include all potential
troop contributors, it would be possible for those planning an operation not
only "to obtain negative answers more rapidly than in the past," Shashi
Tharoor, The Changing Face of Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement, 19 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 408, 423 (1995), but also to avoid unrealistic mandates, since
UNSAS "enables departmental planners to tailor realistic tasks for resources
provided by the governments according to their capabilities." RAMSBOTHAM
& WOODHOUSE, supra note 18, at 288.
230. Its only deployment so far has been to the United Nations Mission to
Eritrea and Ethiopia, which involved "classic peacekeeping" carried out with
the "full consent of the parties, two organized governments, and disciplined
armies," a kind of operation which these days is "the exception." Interna-
tional Peace Academy Conference, SHIRBRIG Deployment in UNMEE: Les-
sons Learned (Mar. 15, 2002). Yet while its original concept of operation
involves deployment for only six months, and with Chapter VI authorization
only, its leaders have suggested that there may be a need to lengthen deploy-
ment time to a year, and that, if troop contributors are amenable, there may
be the possibility of Chapter VII deployment. Id.
231. "[E]ach participating country will decide on a case-by-case basis
whether they will take part in any given SHIRBRIG mission. Their national
decision making procedures (and thereby their national sovereignty) is in
no way affected by participation in SHIRBRIG." SHIRBRIG STEERING COM-
MITTEE, SHIRBRIG: MULTINATIONAL STAND-BY HIGH READINESS BRIGADE FOR
UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS 4.
232. See International Peace Academy Conference, supra note 230.
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2. Consultation
Consultation with potential troop contributors prior to
the passing of a resolution authorizing troop deployment is
one means of increasing the confidence with which the Secur-
ity Council can call for such troops. The Brahimi Report em-
phasizes its importance,23 " and its use has increased. 23 4 The
danger of authorizing operations without such assurances of
support is shown by the situation in Rwanda, where the Secre-
tary-General obtained no commitments from Member States
that they would supply the authorized number of troops.23 5
The Brahimi Report's proposal that the Secretary-General
should have the authority to canvass formally members of the
standby system prior to the authorizing of an operation at-
tempts to avoid such a situation. 236 Yet consultations are no
guarantee against unilateral withdrawal of contingents, which
remains, as the Secretary-General noted during the Bosnian
conflict, the "sovereign right" of states. 23 7 Nor is the Brahimi
Report's further proposal-that resolutions contemplating
sizeable force levels for new operations should remain in draft
form until the necessary troop commitments have been re-
ceived 238 -acceptable to those who believe that a Security
Council Resolution is necessary in order to be able to solicit
troops. According to one staff member at the Secretary-Gen-
eral's Executive Office, 'You can't get troops on the vague pos-
sibility that the Council might decide to authorize a force."23"
3. Mandatory Commitments
Another suggestion regarding how resolutions could be
adopted with confidence that the authorized troop numbers
would be supplied involves guarantees that the Security Coun-
cil members will themselves provide troops. Shashi Tharoor
233. See Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 61.
234. Hans Correll notes that "there has been closer contact between the
Security Council and troop contributors." Hans Correll, Remarks at Interna-
tional Law Weekend, supra note 78.
235. See Tes6n, supra note 106, at 363.
236. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, Annex I1, Recommendation 9(b).
237. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994), supra
note 82, 44.
238. Brahimi Rlport, supra note 224, 60.
239. Interview with staff member at the Executive Office of the Secretary-
General, supra note 64.
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draws from the failures in Rwanda and Bosnia the lesson that
the Security Council can "routinely pass resolutions without
being obliged to provide the troops to implement them."
240
Thus, we find demands for some form of connection between
the Security Council's creation of mandates and Member
States' commitment of peacekeepers.
24 l
Thorvald Stoltenberg calls for commitments of troops
from all Security Council members, suggesting that this would
prevent such destructive conflicts as occurred in the Security
Council between those who had troops on the ground in Bos-
nia and those, notably the U.S., who did not.242 Some suggest
that responsibility should fall on those who sponsor a resolu-
tion, in contrast to what occurred after Resolution 836 regard-
ing the "safe areas" was passed and all of the co-sponsors re-
fused to contribute any more of their own troops to the huge
and perilous expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate that they
were initiating. 243 Kofi Annan has suggested that responsibil-
ity should lie with all those who vote for a resolution.24 4 Partic-
ular pressure, however, may fall on those Permanent Members
who are most able to contribute resources. The number of
troops contributed by the Security Council's Permanent Mem-
240. Tharoor, supra note 229, at 424.
241. BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 139.
242. "1 hope that, in the future, members of the Security Council will be
obliged to provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. When you
do have personnel on the ground, your statements as a politician are much
more balanced and responsible than when you do not have your own people
on the ground and can afford 'courage' on behalf of other people, other
nations' young people." From Stoltenberg-Owoen to Dayton: Interview with Thor-
vald Stoltenberg About Peacekeeping Principles, Politics and Diplomacy, in UN
PEACEKEEPING IN TROUBLE, supra note 9, at 6, 7 (quoting Thorvald
Stoltenberg); see also BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 114 (stating that the "divi-
sion over the role and extent of the use of force had significant repercus-
sions for how the mission was carried out.").
243. SHAWCROSS, supra note 36, at 111. The co-sponsors were France, Rus-
sia, Spain, Britain, the United States, and Canada. Id at 110.
244. Peacekeeping: Countries Struggle to Define Role, U.N. WIRE, (U.N.
Found.), Nov. 7, 2000, at 24, available at http://www.unfoundation.org/
unwire/archives/UNWIREOO 107.asp. ("Annan has said member states vot-
ing for peacekeeping operations should back those votes up with troops if
they can do so."). Restricting the obligation to those who voted for an opera-
tion takes into account the fact that there may be dissenting voices within
the Council, as in the case of the vote approving Resolution 844, from which
Pakistan and Venezuela abstained. See text accompanying note 176, supra.
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bers has fallen dramatically. 245 (It is not true, however, that
they commit no troops at all; according to the last available
monthly report, China and the United States had each con-
tributed one soldier in the service of U.N. peacekeeping.) 246
No Permanent Member offered troops to UNAMIR II; nor had
they deployed troops to UNAMSIL prior to the hostage-tak-
ings,2 4 7 a crisis for which, according to John Hirsch,
"[r] esponsibility clearly fell in the first instance" 2 48 on the Per-
manent Five. The fact that France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom possess the capabilities, and the political will,
to deploy rapidly and effectively when their national interests
are at stake was demonstrated by the swift evacuation from
Rwanda of French 249 and American 250 nationals and the de-
ployment of British troops in Sierra Leone to evacuate nation-
als in the wake of a hostage-crisis. 251 Necessarily, no member
of the Permanent Five has voted against any authorized opera-
tion. Furthermore, the Permanent Five were given the veto in
245. See Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 103-04. "'The P-5 are just not
willing to make any major commitments on troop contributions,' says one
Third World diplomat. They don't want to hear it. 'Spilling Third World
blood is okay. Spilling P-5 blood is a No-No,' he adds." Spilling P-5 Blood Is a
No-No, TERRA VivA, Nov. 6, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.undp.org/
dpa/frontpagearchive/novemberOO/6novOO/tv 10600.pdf.
246. United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributors (Military Observers, Ci-
vilian Police, Troops) as of 31 March 2002, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/contributors/mar02.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). France had con-
tributed 241 troops, the United Kingdom 424, and the Russian Federation
113. Id.
247. As of May 19, 2000, the UNAMSIL troops were provided by Ghana,
Guinea, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia. Fourth Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, supra note 145, at 18.
248. HIRSCH, supra note 127, at 88.
249. "France dispatched its planes to Kigali within 2 days of the plane go-
ing down." OAU Report, supra note 191, at 13.5.
250. "When disorder became rampant on April 7, the US quickly inter-
vened to evacuate its citizens by land via Burundi." KLINGHOFFER, supra note
193, at 91.
251. The U.K. government, along with other members of the Security
Council, turned down the Secretary-General's request for a Rapid Reaction
Force to help UNAMSIL, but in the wake of the kidnapping it deployed 700
combat troops to Freetown in May 2000, outside U.N. operational control,
with the objective of accomplishing "the safe evacuation of nationals of the
United Kingdom and others for whom it was responsible." Fourth Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra. Leone, supra note 145,
69.
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exchange for providing the bulk of the forces. 25 2 They no
longer provide the bulk of the forces, but they retain veto
power. The argument has been made that since the Perma-
nent Five pay a larger percentage of the peacekeeping bill
than their regular budget share,253 they are not obliged to pro-
vide troops.254 Yet this notion rests on the assumption of
prompt payment, which has historically not been a given.
U.N. members, especially the United States, have fallen far be-
hind in their financial contributions to the peacekeeping op-
erations that they authorize.2 55
Bangladesh has proposed that each Permanent Member
should have to provide 5 percent of the troops for any U.N.
peacekeeping operation.25 6 Unsurprisingly, the Permanent
Members acted quickly to paralyze the proposal. 2 57 The major
powers are unwilling to participate in robust U.N. peacekeep-
ing operations under the command of the Secretary-General:
Leading Western militaries have, over the last five or six years,
lost confidence in the U.N.'s capacity to command and control
peacekeeping operations effectively in high risk situations.258
It was for this reason that the U.K. troops in Sierra Leone re-
mained under national command, 259 and partly for this reason
that the idea of a Secretary-General-led peacekeeping force in
252. BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 11.
253. See G.A. Res. 235, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 169, 1 5, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/235 (deciding that with respect to the peacekeeping
budget, "the permanent members of the Security Council should form a sep-
arate level and that, consistent with their special responsibilities for the
maintenance of peace and security, they should be assessed at a higher rate
than for the regular budget.").
254. Adriaan Verheul, noting that it is "often overlooked that the US pays
a large part. . . of the peacekeeping bill," argues that "if the US pays the bill,
they, don't have to commit troops." Verhuel, supra note 215.
255. Horror in Rwanda, Shame in the U.N, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at A22.
256. Spilling P-5 Blood Is a No-No, supra note 245, at I ("This will, of course,
be in keeping with their responsibilities as permanent members.").
257. Interview with a Member State's Ambassador to the United Nations,
in New York (Apr. 15, 2002).
258. Interview with David Malone, supra note 220. See also NEUFFER, supra
note 99, at 126 ("Tired of being asked to send their soldiers abroad to mis-
sions that were often ill-conceived and poorly planned, no country wanted to
donate troops, not even by the end of May, when nearly half a million
Rwandans lay dead and international observers returned from the country
with tales of carnage and bloodlust.").
259. Interview with David Malone, supra note 220.
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Afghanistan was rejected in favor of a multinational opera-
tion.260 The head of the Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions is systematically addressing the issues that led to the
U.N.'s damaged credibility, 261 and David Malone believes that
the damage "is remediable, over time,"26 2 but Western militar-
ies have become used to the idea of Coalitions of the Willing,
in which they operate under fewer constraints, budgetary and
otherwise, than in U.N. operations. 263 Even if the major pow-
ers were willing to serve under U.N. command, it has been
argued that they are unsuitable participants: In the words of
Paul Szasz, forces provided by the Permanent Members "are
likely to follow the commands of their capitals rather than the
U.N. ' 264 Thus, like the proposals of mandatory contributions
from those who sit on the Security Council, or propose or vote
for a resolution, this suggestion risks acting only as a deterrent,
possibly resulting in far less U.N. peacekeeping. 2 65
4. Professional Help
Another proposal is for the United Nations to combat the
problems of slow deployment and insufficient troops through
the use of mercenaries. This might offer greater reliability
than the U.N. system, where Member States may withdraw
their contingents at any time without adverse consequences. It
might also be more cost-effective, since troop provision could
be determined by what was contracted for, rather than what
happened to be available. 2 6 In the words of David Malone,
260. Id. ("There was discussion early on about a UN-commanded force in
Afghanistan, but that didn't proceed very far down the track .... There was
no sense of enthusiasm from leading Western countries to serve in Afghani-
stan in a UN-commanded force. There was greater comfort with the idea of a
Coalition of the Willing.").
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. See also Telephone Interview with Paul Szasz (Mar. 11, 2002) ("If
you want to use substantial force, you have to rely on the big powers, and
they won't allow the U.N. to have real command of their forces.").
264. Id.
265. See BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 140. Perhaps for this reason, the
Brahimi Report avoids endorsing such recommendations, simply stating that
"serious great power backing" is necessary, but leaving it undefined. Brahimi
Report, supra note 224, 25.
266. Interview with David Malone, supra note 220.
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"large chunks of peacekeeping" are already contracted oUt,2 6 7
but only in the area of logistics; the arrival of the professional
mercenary among the ranks of frontline personnel may well
be greeted by what Frederick Forsyth calls the "politically cor-
rect cries of 'Yuck."' 2 68 Indeed, while the Secretary-General
has not rejected the idea,2"9 he has acknowledged the strong
opposition of Member States.2 7°1 This opposition is illustrated
by the reaction to a February 2002 Green Paper, in which the
U.K. Foreign Office mooted the idea that mercenaries em-
ployed by private military companies might be hired for
peacekeeping operations.2 7' One Labour Party M.P., and
member of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select
Committee, Andrew Mackinlay, described the proposals as "re-
pugnant,"2 72 and stated that even to "contemplate giving such
companies a veneer of respectability"2 73 was "breathtaking in
the extreme."2 74 He claimed that the proposal "would create
the potential for wrongdoing by companies that could then
dissolve themselves and lose themselves in remote parts of the
world, unaccountable for their conduct or stewardship of
war." 275 Another M.P. asked the Prime Minister whether he
supported the idea of employing mercenaries "who often work
for the most odious regimes and whose only loyalty is to
money."2 7 Yet we might question the idea that the use of mer-
cenaries would necessarily mean abandoning any moral
strengths of the U.N. peacekeeping system, particularly as re-
gards incentives and accountability. After all, the claim has
267. Id.
268. Frederick Forsyth, Send in the Mercenaries, WALL ST.J., May 15, 2000, at
A50.
269. Interview with David Malone, sulra note 220.
270. Id.
271. See Peacekeeping 'Role'for Mercena ies, BBC News Online, Feb. 13, 2002,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/1ow/utknews/politics/181 7495.strn.
272. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
273. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
274. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
275. Peacekeeping 'Role'for Mercenaries, BBC, Feb. 13, 2002, at http://www.
globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2002/uk.htm (last visited Feb.
5, 2003).
276. Prime Minister's Questions, (Feb. 13, 2002), at http://www.publications.
parliament. Lik/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020213/debtext/20213-03.htm#
20213-03spnew9 (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) (question raised by Llew Smith,
M.P.).
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been made that the national contingents that typically form a
U.N. peacekeeping operation are chosen "not for martial
prowess but because their governments are willing to send
them, often for no better reason than to collect a daily sti-
pend."277 As for accountability, the failures of the present sys-
tem, as demonstrated most dramatically in Rwanda, led the au-
thors of the OAU Report to note that "[n] one of the key actors
on the Security Council or in the Secretariat who failed to pre-
vent the genocide has ever paid any kind of price,"278 adding
that "[i]nstead of international accountability, it appears that
international impunity is the rule of the day."2 7 9 It might in-
deed be possible to hold commercially contracted personnel
more accountable for the services they deliver than Member
States, whose personnel have often proved deeply unsatisfac-
tory in recent years. 280
B. Avoiding Unrealistic Promises
The Brahimi Report acknowledges the danger of de-
ploying small numbers of peacekeepers in the kind of opera-
tion suited to a cooperative environment when indications
suggest that the environment will be anything but cooperative.
Relying on best-case scenarios is unsuitable where the parties
have exhibited "worst-case behaviour. '" 28 1 Yet the Report's sug-
gested solution, namely the deployment of "bigger forces, bet-
ter equipped and more costly," 28 2 is problematic. Firstly, big-
ger forces must mean fewer U.N. operations, since U.N. re-
sources are already "pared to the bone. '12 8 3 In addition, the
277. Max Boot, Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of UN Peacekeeping, 79
FOREIGN AFF. 143, 145 (Mar.-Apr. 2000) (reviewing WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, DE-
LIVER Us FROM EVIL: PEACEKEEPERS, WARLORDS, AND A WORLD OF ENDLESS
CONFLICT).
278. OAU Report, supra note 191.
279. Id.; see also text accompanying note 231.
280. Interview with David Malone, supra note 220 (emphasis added).
281. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 51.
282. Id.
283. Playing at Foreign Policy, WASH. POST, May 25, 1999, at A36. Indeed,
the main advantage of the "light option" of 7,600 troops for the Bosnian
"safe areas" was that it "present[ed] an approach that [was] most likely to
correspond to the volume of troops and material resources which [could]
realistically be expected from Member States and which [met] the impera-
tive need for rapid deployment." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Se-
curity Council Resolution 836 (1993), supra note 73, 5. As it was, UNPROFOR
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proposal threatens the traditionally consensual nature of U.N.
peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report deems it essential that
peacekeepers be aware that consent is manipulable. 28 4 Yet the
recommendation of Ian Johnstone that they should assume
that consent is unreliable, though it differs little in sub-
stance, 28 5 would be, according to one staff member at the Sec-
retary-General's Executive Office, the end of peacekeeping.2 16
Peacekeeping has traditionally meant assisting parties in the
implementation of a ceasefire or a peace agreement.28 7 For
the United Nations to express doubts about such an agree-
ment "would be an insult, and the UN is not in the business of
insulting." 2
88
Less drastic than basing troop numbers on the assump-
tion that consent is unreliable is the option of having contin-
gency plans for each operation, thus avoiding the assumption
that all parties to an agreement intend to respect it.28 9 The
Independent Inquiry into Rwanda, stating that "UNAMIR was
established without a fall-back position or a worst-case scena-
was the largest and most expensive mission that the U.N. had deployed, RAm-
SBOTI HAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 18, at xvii, with an annual budget of
$1.6 billion, Sills, supra note 221, at 453. SeeAdam Roberts, Communal Conflict
as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia, in
PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY 27, 52-53 (Olara A.
Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle eds., 1998) ("There is a widespread perception
that the former Yugoslavia had massive (if still inadequate) resources de-
voted to it and that the UN has not succeeded in maintaining a proper bal-
ance between the various crises that demand its attention.").
284. Brahirni Report, supra note 224, 48.
285. "Peacekeepers have to assume that this consent can't be relied upon:
you try to build consent over time, you work with the parties continually.
Don't just assume that signatures are enough." Johnstone, supra note 78.
286. Interview in New York (Dec. 3, 2001).
287. Id.
288. See Center for International Studies Conference, International Law
and International Organizations in Situations of Civil War, NYU School of
Law (February 23-24, 2002).
289. Interview with John L. Hirsch, supra note 209. See also Brahimi Report,
supra note 224, 26 ("It is vitally important that negotiators, the Securiw,
Council, Secretariat mission planners, and mission participants alike under-
stand . ..how the environment may change under their feet once they
arrive, and what they realistically plan to do if and when it does change.
Each of these must be factored into an operation's entry strategy and, in-
deed, into the basic decision about whether an operation is feasible and
should even be attempted.").
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rio,"2 9 recommends willingness to adopt contingency plans
for both existing and future operations. 291 Yet such plans,
even if never put into operation, may threaten the extent to
which the United Nations is seen to trust any peace agreement
and thus, perhaps, the level of trust that the parties place in
the United Nations and each other: Indeed, it is due to fears
that documents suggesting concerns about a party's lack of
good faith might leak out and lead to accusations of bias that
the United Nations has traditionally been reluctant to commit
contingency plans to writing.2 9 2
Thus none of these suggestions provides a means for the
United Nations to avoid the problem of inadequate troop pro-
vision while continuing its peacekeeping in recognizable form.
Neither the U.N. Standby System, nor SHIRBRIG, nor in-
creased consultation with troop-contributing countries pro-
vides any guarantee against refusals by Member States to join
or remain within a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Neither a
U.N. standing army, nor a system of mandatory troop contri-
butions by members of the Security Council, nor reliance on
mercenaries is politically acceptable. Finally, to base troop
levels on the assumption that any peace agreement is unrelia-
ble would be a radical departure from U.N. tradition and, on
one reading, the end of peacekeeping; widespread use of con-
tingency planning might have similar, albeit less dramatic, im-
plications. Thus it appears that a future deployment of similar
U.N. peacekeeping forces into a situation where such warning
signs appear would be likely to face similar obstacles.29 3
V. NEITHER INADEQUACY NOR INACTIVITY
It might then seem that in the face of such warning signs
about the number of troops likely to be required or provided,
the Security Council should refrain from taking any action at
290. Independent Inquiry, supra note 92, at 42.
291. See id. at 56.
292. Interview with John L. Hirsch, supra note 209.
293. Indeed, the under-resourcing of U.N. peacekeeping operations con-
tinned after the events described. The Secretary-General, in his report of 14
March 2001, some ten months after the Sierra Leone kidnapping crisis,
stated that he had "continued efforts to seek the urgently needed contribu-
tion to UNAMSIL of additional well-trained and well-equipped troops."
Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, 65, U.N. Doc. S/2001/228 (2001).
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all. After all, the surest way to avoid a gap between mandate
and means is to have no mandate. Indeed, disregarding either
kind of warning sign can lead to a halfhearted deployment
that is worse than no deployment at all.29 4 With respect to
non-cooperative environments, the Bosnian "safe areas" indi-
cated the dangers caused by an undersized U.N. force and its
apparent guarantee of protection. The population of the "safe
areas" was increased by refugees seeking protection from eth-
nic cleansing: 2 5 Thus, "safe areas" became natural targets for
Serbian attacks.29 ! In the case of Srebrenica, the designation
of the "safe area" provided the civilian population with a sense
of security that was drastically misplaced. 29 7 Those involved in
establishing "safe areas" have agonized over the extent to
which their actions may have led to the slaughter of over 7,000
inhabitants of Srebrenica. 298 Addressing failures to achieve
the authorized troop levels, the Brahimi Report warns that
"[tlo deploy a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile
peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a popula-
tion engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage
the credibility of the United Nations as a whole. '29" A loss of
294. See Quentin Peel, Peacekeeping on a Shoestring, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
May 15, 2000, at 21 (quoting John Davies, a "specialist in conflict manage-
inent at the University of Maryland," as saying that "' [w]hen threats of inter-
vention are made that are not credible, we have found that an accelerator of
conflict .... If you want to make a commitment, it must be a comprehensive
and total commitment."'). See also Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 59
("Member States must not be led to believe that they are doing something
useful for countries in trouble when-by under-resourcing missions-they
are more likely agreeing to a waste of human resources, time and money.").
295. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3367th mtg. at 42, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3367
(1994) (statement of Mr. Olhaye, Djibouti).
296. See Nicole M. Procida, Note, Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, A
Case Study: Employing United Nation Mechanisms to Enforce the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gernocide, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 655, 677 (1995).
297. See Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica: A 'Safe'
Area, Epilogue (Apr. 10, 2002), at http://www.srebrenica.nl/ en/con-
tent epiloog.htm.
298. See, e.g., Major D.M. Last, Reflections from the Field: Ethical Challenges in
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventions, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Spring
2000, at 73, 82.
299. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 60. See also Srebrenica Report, supra
note 58, 499 (several representatives on the Security Council warned that
"in failing to provide a credible military deterrent, the safe area policy would
be gravely damaging to the Council's reputation, and, indeed, to the United
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U.N. credibility, which is, in Kofi Annan's words, one of the
organization's "indispensable assets,' 30 0 may deter those in
conflict from seeking U.N. help in the future.30 1 It may also
make potential troop contributors less likely to participate in
future operations. -10 2 Thus, the under-resourcing of opera-
tions can be self-perpetuating.
However, it is preferable to avoid a choice between the
Security Council deploying a U.N. force in unsuitable condi-
tions or doing nothing at all. That dichotomy would inevitably
lead to further deployment of under-resourced operations,
since, as Shashi Tharoor puts it, "[f] or most of the crises that
thrust themselves on the United Nations' agenda, indifference
is impossible. '" 30 3 UNPROFOR was established, for example,
despite the fact that political groups in Yugoslavia continued
Nations as a whole.") See also BOULDEN, supra note 34, at 116 (by failing to
back up its resolutions concerning the "safe areas" with "concrete support of
the mandate's implementation, the Security Council contributed to a serious
disintegration of UN credibility that extended well beyond the Balkans").
300. See Kofi A. Annan, Challenges of the New Peacekeeping, in PEACEMAKING
AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY, supra note 214, at 169, 186
("[T]he organization's legitimacy and credibility [are] its indispensable as-
sets."); see also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), supra note 60, 82 ("[T]he credibility of the
United Nations is of the utmost importance and must be safeguarded at all
times. Few things damage it more than to give United Nations peace-keepers
tasks that cannot be accomplished in prevailing circumstances. And the
damage is not only to peace-keeping. Loss of United Nations credibility
there will affect the Organization's endeavors for development, for the envi-
ronment, for human rights and for every other important objective.").
301. Security Council representative Mr. Jesus (Cape Verde) stated that
the failure of the Security Council and the United Nations to do more to
honor the Security Council's decisions on the Bosnian conflict was bound to
have a major negative impact on the outcome of the current and potential
conflicts. It might be interpreted by those that would like to take in their
hands the solution of their disputes with others as incapacity by the United
Nations to stand up to its responsibilities to maintain peace and reverse ag-
gression. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3247th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3247
(1993).
302. SeeAnnan, supra note 300, at 172. If the U.N. fails, as it did in Bosnia
and Somalia, to achieve the "right force structure to be able to carry out its
mandate and to protect the operation," its credibility "will be eroded even
further, and it will become increasingly difficult to find troop contributors."
Id.
303. Tharoor, supra note 229, at 413.
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to object to the U.N. plan,30 4 because the Secretary-General
judged "that the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping
operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the par-
ties is less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch
will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new confla-
gration in Yugoslavia. ' 30 5 The Secretary-General described a
similar dilemma after UNPROFOR's deployment in Croatia,
when he stated that "soldiering on in hope seems preferable to
withdrawing in abdication. "3 6 Whereas in those circum-
stances the absence of a U.N. force was presented as a type of
abdication, authorizing a force for Rwanda that had no chance
of achieving rapid deployment has also been described as part
of a conscious abdication of responsibility by the Security
Counci.13 7 In circumstances where warning signs exist with re-
spect to the level of the parties' consent or of the willingness of
Member States to contribute troops, the best way for the Se-
curity Council to meet, rather than abdicate, its responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security may
be neither inactivity nor authorization of a U.N. force in un-
suitable conditions, but a third option. A U.N. force was
deployed "faute de mieux' in Bosnia,1118 and again in Sierra Le-
one,311 in the latter case particularly because of the limited
304. John A. Machinis, Piecemeal Peacekeeping: The United Nations Protection
Force in the Former Yugoslavia, in "THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE": TOWARD A NEW
PARADIGM OF PEACE OPERATIONS 113, 116 (John T. Fishel ed., 1998).
305. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 721 (1991), supra note 156, 28. SeeAshton, supra note 159, at 787 (UN-
PROFOR was deployed "because it was the lesser of two evils and because it
met the international community's demand for action.").
306. Report of the Secretaty-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1994), supra
note 1, 45.
307. See text accompanying note 189, supra.
308. Srebrenica Report, supra note 58, 492 ("None of the conditions for
the deployment of peacekeepers had been met: there was no peace agree-
ment-not even a functioning ceasefire-there was no clear will to peace
and there was no clear consent by the belligerents. Nevertheless, faute de
mieux, the Security Council decided that a United Nations peacekeeping
force would be deployed.").
309. See David M. Malone, The Security Council in the 1990's: Boom and
Bust?, Keynote Address to Canadian Council on International Law (Oct. 28,
1999) ("[O]ften faute de mieux, particularly given the limited capacities of
most regional organizations, the UN was again called upon in 1999 to deploy
large peace operations in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone.").
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capacity of regional organizations. 3 10 U.N. partnerships with
regional or multinational organizations, to increase their ca-
pacities, might be one way of ensuring that, where a U.N.
peacekeeping force is inappropriate, there exists a viable alter-
native.
Such an approach would utilize the strengths of the
United Nations and of multinational or regional forces, while
asking neither to attempt tasks that are beyond their capabili-
ties. According to Dan Lindley, multinational forces offer "rel-
atively streamlined decision-making procedures,"'' l I and "tend
to be more highly motivated,"3 1 2 than collective security orga-
nizations. The participation of major powers is more likely,
and more likely to be effective, than in U.N. operations. 313 As
for regional organizations, they may possess greater regional
knowledge than the United Nations,3 14 and may be more likely
to show lasting commitment to resolving local crises.3 15 Re-
gional peacekeepers may also adjust more rapidly to the situa-
tion on the ground than international troops,-3 6 and their
presence has a more obvious justification. 3 17 Shaharyar Khan
finds it clear that, "given the parameters of a debt-ridden UN
and donor states reluctant to commit their troops except in
their own backyards, the future trend for peace-keeping is
likely to be the greater involvement of regional groups."'3 18
The Security Council might not only extend its support
more willingly to regional than to U.N.-led operations, but
also, through its active involvement, limit some of the poten-
tial drawbacks of regional and multinational forces. The sup-
310. Id.
311. Dan Lindley, Collective Security Organizations and Internal Conflict, in
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT, supra note 12, at
537, 541.
312. Id.
313. Interview with David Malone, supra note 220.
314. See UNA-UK, Briefing Paper: Regional Security Action, at http://
www.una-uk.org/UN&C/regional.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
315. Id.
316. See SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, THE SHALLOWr GRAVES OF RWANDA 214
(photo. reprint 2001) (2000).
317. See Feil, supra note 196, 66.
318. KHAN, supra note 316, at 215.
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ply of training, 3 19 equipment, and resources is one example., 21
Regional collective security organizations are less likely than
the United Nations to possess military force and financial and
political support that are adequate for the situation into which
they are deployed, 32 ' and assets may be particularly limited in
the regions where they are most needed. 32 2 Matthew Vaccaro
suggests that regional troops should be given advance training
and access to pre-positioned, U.N.-owned equipment,3 2" and
that, in the case of Rwanda, if such forces had existed, the
Member States responsible for the bulk of the U.N.
peacekeeping bill might have supported a Security Council de-
cision to deploy them.32 4 U.N. involvement may also counter-
act the danger, identified by Dan Lindley, that members of
regional organizations are "influenced by political, economic,
ethnic, and other ties."3 25 According to Lindley, the "United
319. Ramsbotham notes as one of the obstacles to effective action by re-
gional organizations "a lack of standardized training and common doctrine."
RAMSBOTHAM & WOODIIOUSE, supra note 18, at 205.
320. See KHAN, supra note 316, at 216 ("(a) Troop-contributing nations
need to be identified and peacekeeping training and preparedness imparted
to them on a national or regional basis. (b) Adequate financing, assets and
equipment should be ensured to these countries, with Third World TCNs
[troop contributing nations] being assisted with matching assets and equip-
ment from those donor states that are disinclined to commit troops into
dangerous Third World theatres."); see aso Brahimi Report, supra note 224,
54 ("Providing training, equipment, logistical support and other resources
to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from
all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to
set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council
resolution.").
321. See Lindley, supra note 311, at 556.
322. See Feil, supra note 196, 67 ("[T]he countries in the very regions in
which a force may be required are in dire financial, social, and political
straits. They would be hard-pressed to participate in intervention operations
without assistance."). See also Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 54 ("[M]ilitary
resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and
troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands
of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere.").
323. Vaccaro, supra note 113, at 401-02.
324. Id. at 401.
325. Lindley, supra note 311, at 556.
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Nations's worldwide membership neutralizes some of these
sources of bias. '"3 2
6
The danger that multinational forces might advance the
political objectives of a single state was illustrated by the de-
ployment of Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. It was led by
France, which was, according to Samantha Power, "perhaps
the least appropriate country to intervene because of its warm
relationship with the genocidal Hutu regime,"3 27 and it had
what Philip Gourevitch describes as "some rented Senegalese
troops along for the ride to create an aura of multilateral-
ism. '"328 Although it saved thousands of lives,3 29 it has been
accused of offering protection primarily to the Hutu perpetra-
tors rather than the Tutsi victims. 3 0 Again, the Security Coun-
cil might have a role in limiting such dangers. Concerns about
the objectives and behavior of coalition leaders might be less-
ened if the Security Council gave its support to coalition oper-
ations only if they included a contingent of U.N. military ob-
servers with sufficient manpower and freedom of movement to
monitor the coalition's adherence to any conditions the Coun-
cil may have placed upon its endorsement.-33  Whereas, in the
absence of the kind of collective security system envisaged by
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter,3 3 2 it is unrealistic to conceive of
forceful multinational operations functioning under U.N.
command and control,333 the Security Council may give mul-
tinational operations the international legitimacy they re-
quire.3 -3 4
326. Id. See also Independent Inquiry, supra note 92, at 55 ("The United Na-
tions remains the only organization which can bring global legitimacy to
peacekeeping efforts.").
327. POWER, supra note 70, at 380.
328. GOUREVITCH, supra note 115, at 155.
329. "[A] reasonable conclusion is that Turquoise saved around 10-13,000
lives." Gerard Prunier, Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Po-
litical Dead End, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 102, at 281, 303.
330. Lindley, supra note 311, at 547.
331. William J. Durch, Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s, in
UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 113, at 1, 28.
332. Id. at 27.
333. Id.
334. Id. (adding that the Security Council's role as a legitimizing force
might also encourage states "to grant coalition forces the right to overfly,
refuel in, or stage from their territory").
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Thus, there exists a range of ways in which the Security
Council might meet its responsibility for the maintenance of
peace and security, even in situations where a U.N. force is
inappropriate. It is these alternatives, rather than those that
try to adapt Secretary-General-led peacekeeping to situations
for which it is inherently unsuitable, that should be further
explored.
One counter-argument in response might be that in-
creased use of regional or multinational forces in place of
U.N. operations might lead to the loss of some valuable quali-
ties that only U.N. peacekeeping possesses. Impartiality and
universality are two strengths that have traditionally been asso-
ciated with U.N. operations. Yet, arguably, the extent to which
these two qualities are guaranteed in U.N. peacekeeping is eas-
ily overstated. With regard to impartiality, the notion that
Member States' participation in U.N. operations is apolitical
and disinterested is naive. Even though peacekeeping theory
requires a neutral international force, the countries willing to
commit their troops to an operation must, according to Mat-
thew Vaccaro, "see their interests served by such participation,
which may raise questions about their neutrality."3 3 5 To call
for international accountability is to miss the point that, as Ed-
ward Luck puts it, "national leaders are ultimately accountable
to their people, not just to the rules of international institu-
tions or to the ideals of the international community. '3 3 6 As
for universality, the current arrangement offers neither univer-
sality of troop contributors nor universality of areas of deploy-
ment. Whereas under earlier theory and practice, the compo-
sition of peacekeeping forces reflected the U.N.'s universal-
ity,33 7 the modern reality is more often one that, according to
Adriaan Verheul, does not "reflect the solidarity on which the
Charter is built: ' 338 the Security Council "devises a mandate
and expects soldiers from poor countries to die for it.''33
335. Vaccaro, supra note 113, at 397.
336. Edward C. Luck, Book Review, 94 AM. -. INT'L. L. 603 (2000) (review-
ing WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, DELIVER US FROM Evil: WARLORDS AND A WORLD OF
ENDLESS CONFLICT (2000)) ("To be operational, humanitarian values must
be embedded in these domestic processes, as well as in global conven-
tions.").
337. See Tharoor, supra note 229, at 414.
338. Verheul, supra note 215.
339. Id.
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Universality of deployment is belied by a lack of commitment
to address conflict in Africa.3 40 This erosion of two of the
touted strengths of U.N. peacekeeping supports the argument
that since its use in operations where the willingness of troop
contributors and warring parties is uncertain has proven prob-
lematic, and since no politically acceptable proposals exist for
how to avoid these problems through the U.N. system alone,
attention should turn to alternative ways in which the Security
Council can meet its responsibility for the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security.
VI. CONCI.USION
The inability to carry out these peacekeeping and security
mandates can be attributed, at least in part, to an inadequate
number of properly equipped troops. In each case, troop
levels were authorized in the face of clear signs that they would
not rapidly be made available or would nevertheless be inade-
quate. The fact that the warnings were explicit that the con-
sent neither of the parties in conflict nor potential troop con-
tributors was likely to be forthcoming-indeed, several of the
warnings were contained in Secretary-General's Reports to the
Security Council-suggests that merely improving the infor-
mation available to the Security Council will not cure its inade-
quacy in dealing with such situations. It might be objected
that to focus on a group of operations that includes some of
the Organization's most prominent failures is inevitably to
paint an unrepresentatively bleak picture of the U.N.'s
peacekeeping abilities. Yet the very fact that these failures re-
ceive such prominence increases their importance, since the
damage that they do to the Organization's credibility has an
adverse effect on the willingness of parties in conflict and po-
tential troop-contributors to trust the United Nations in future
operations. Nor has their prominence ensured that all the
necessary lessons have been learned, as was shown by the kid-
napping crisis in Sierra Leone, which was reminiscent of U.N.
failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia and was itself followed
by months of UNAMSIL understaffing. As the Brahimi Report
340. See David M. Malone & Ramesh Thakur, UN Peacekeeping: Lessons
Learned?, 7 GLOBAL GO,,RNANCE 11, 16 (2001) ("Countries with large finan-
cial and military resources remain reluctant to deploy either to address Afri-
can conflicts.").
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states, "[o]ver the last decade, the United Nations has repeat-
edly failed to meet the challenge '3 4 1 of "sav[ing] succeeding
generations from the scourge of war,"34 2 and "it can do no bet-
ter today. " 3
43
Thus, as the Brahimi Report concludes, "significant insti-
tutional change '3 44 is necessary. Various suggestions have
been made regarding ways to effect this change within the ex-
isting system of Secretary-General-led operations. Yet none of-
fers the United Nations a politically acceptable means of sur-
mounting the obstacles created when troop contributors or
parties in conflict are clearly unwilling to comply. The risk re-
mains that fig-leaf resolutions that bear little chance of receiv-
ing a rapid supply of troops for implementation, or fig-leaf op-
erations that bear little chance of success in non-consensual
environments, will continue to be created as a result of the
pressure to seem to do something. 345 Such halfhearted ac-
tions represent an abdication of the Security Council's respon-
sibility. So does the refusal to take any action at all. Efforts at
innovation should therefore be directed at a third option,
whereby, in situations where clear warning signs exist concern-
ing the willingness of parties in conflict or of troop contribu-
tors to comply, the Security Council could create and develop
forms of collaboration between the United Nations and re-
gional and multinational coalitions, for whom robust action is
more appropriate. Thus the credibility and the manpower of
the United Nations could be conserved and strengthened, in
preparation for those operations to which the Organization is
better suited.
341. Brahimi Report, supra note 224, 1.
342. Id. (quoting U.N. CHARTER pmbl.) (internal quotations omitted).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. In the case of Bosnia, for example, it has been said that "l[t] he crucial
factor in the decision to deploy peacekeepers was neither humanitarian nor
military. It was a political imperative-namely for the Security Council to be
seen as doing something when individual member states were unwilling to
act." Prager, supra note 62. Thus, the United Nations "ended up being more
in the fig-leaf business than the security business." DAVID HALBERSTAM, WAR
IN A TIME OF PEACE: BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE GENERALS 125 (2001).
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